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Moral disengagement theory (Bandura, 1999) is a popular theory widely used to 
explain people’s ability to violate their moral convictions without incurring self-
condemnation. Assuming the internalization of moral standards in socialization, the 
theory suggests that sufficient enticement may motivate people to disengage their moral 
standards so as to violate them without negative consequences for the self. Thereby moral 
disengagement theory is proposed to be distinct from cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1954) in that disengagement is assumed to be an antecedent to injurious 
behavior. This temporal assumption has been all but ignored by extant research and 
presents a gap in the literature that the current work seeks to address by use of an 
allocation paradigm for the experimental study of moral disengagement. Using a slightly 
altered dictator game, four studies showed that a fairness standard was clearly endorsed 
and recognized in the abstract (Study 1), but easily violated when behaving unfairly could 
benefit the self (Study 2). Furthermore, though pre-decisional adjustment of the fairness 
norm was evident, participants violated the norm even when no pre-behavioral 
justification took place (Study 3). Lastly, time to think decreased, not increased, self-
favoring behavior (Study 4). Together, these studies provide scant evidence of moral 
disengagement and suggest that processes other than moral disengagement may be at 
work in the execution of (relatively benign) immoral behavior. Implication and future 
directions are discussed. 
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True! Nervous, very, very dreadfully nervous I had been and am; but why will you say that I 
am mad? […] Hearken! And observe how healthily, how calmly, I can tell you the whole story. 
- Edgar Allen Poe, A Tell-Tale Heart 
 
Introduction and General Information 
 
Even a cursory scan of the newspaper on any given day suffices to remind us all that immoral 
behavior, large and small, is alive and well. People pilfer office supplies, cheat on income taxes, 
lie about reasons they stay home from work or can’t meet friends; students take tests for others 
or copy results; corporations dump hazardous waste into landfills, sickening entire communities; 
priests abuse children whose grievances are exacerbated by the church’s concealment of these 
crimes; politicians the world over get caught in corruption scandals (among others). There also 
seems to be no limit to the atrocities and brutalities humans are able to inflict on each other under 
the cloak of personal and religious freedom, power, or other benefits for oneself or one’s group. 
And yet many of those perpetrators, many of us, are able to return home and sleep just fine. Few 
of us leave the daily battlefield of (im)moral behavior so scarred by what we’ve done that we are 
unable to look at ourselves in the mirror. How do we negotiate the demands of social life with 
our and our group’s desires, particularly when these conflict with the rights of others? Surely, 
there are many paths to immoral behavior and its justification (e.g., Batson, in prep), but the one 




The concept of moral disengagement originates in Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 
1991), which proposes that moral behavior is regulated by moral standards and self-sanctions. 
 
2 
Moral standards are necessary consensual codes of conduct that regulate collective life so as to 
respect everyone’s rights and wellbeing. These moral standards that prohibit lying, stealing, 
cheating, unfair or harmful behavior, etc., according to the theory, are initially externally 
dictated, but eventually internalized in the process of socialization. Behaviors are then judged in 
relationship to these standards and anticipated rewards and punishments. Importantly, those 
rewards and punishments are not just offered by the social environment, but also by oneself. 
Acting in line with one’s standards results in feelings of self-worth and approval, whereas 
violations of the standards threaten to incur not only social, but also self-punishment (e.g., in the 
form of guilt or shame). Anticipated self-rewards and punishments are particularly important 
since external deterrents to immoral behavior are not always immediately present and one’s 
behavior can go undetected. Hence, acts that violate personally held beliefs are avoided so as to 
not result in self-condemnation.  
However, life presents many opportunities to reap benefits from precisely the kind of 
behavior that violates our standards. Insofar as an individual endorses a certain moral principle 
(e.g., not to cheat or lie), a sufficiently strong enticement to behave immorally (e.g., to get a 
bigger tax return if one doesn’t report all income, to cheat on a test to make an A, not a B, in the 
class, etc.) presents a conflict that can be resolved by either abstaining from the immoral 
behavior (e.g., not cheating) or by disengaging moral self-censure from immoral conduct (i.e., 
employ self-exonerative reasoning in the interest of self-protection). In the latter case, moral self-
censure is disabled, thereby allowing inhumane and immoral behavior without self-
condemnation (Bandura, 1999). Such a process leads to the prediction that an action should be 
judged differently depending on whether the actor has an interest in a particular outcome, or 
whether the actor has no interest in the outcome. Indeed, research on past behavior supports such 
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divergent judgments: participants judged favoring themselves to be more fair than an uninvolved 
observer judged the same action (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007). Moreover, this self-favoring bias 
was eliminated under cognitive constraint, indicating that it is not an automatic affective bias, but 
rather resembles a more controlled process in the service of self-protection (Valdesolo & 
DeSteno, 2008). Moral disengagement, too, is proposed to be a controlled process: as both social 
and self-sanctions act anticipatorily, so do the processes of disengagement.  
More specifically, action can be disengaged from moral self-control through four 
mechanisms: Morally justifying the act, diminishing responsibility, minimizing consequences, 
and dehumanizing or blaming the victim.  
Moral justification entails the depiction of injurious behavior as serving virtuous purposes. 
Through moral justification, for example, engaging in violence may be viewed as “protecting 
cherished values, preserving world peace, saving humanity from subjugation or honoring the 
country’s commitments” (Bandura, 2002, p. 103). The very behavior that is usually condemned, 
in essence, is reified as a duty or moral imperative that serves a greater good.  
Diminishing personal responsibility reduces a person’s culpability for the execution and 
consequences of harmful acts. This may be achieved by attributing responsibility to a legitimate 
authority (e.g., Milgram, 1974) or by diffusing responsibility within a group through perceptions 
of collective action. Soldiers, for example, “merely” follow orders or act in groups, in which 
individual contributions can either not be identified or the accountability rests on so many that 
one alone does not feel incriminated (Darley & Latané, 1968; Schopler et al., 1995).  
Minimizing the consequences of detrimental behavior is achieved by creating physical 
distance to the harm done, and by misconstruing or by outright ignoring the adverse effects of 
one’s actions. The most powerful way to achieve this is to remove oneself from the victims’ 
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agony or other negative results of one’s actions (as is often the case with aerial bombings or 
other forms of modern warfare) – a fact that Milgram (1974) observed when he required the 
“teacher” to make physical contact with the “learner” in his famous obedience studies. 
Obedience rates dropped markedly when victim and perpetrator were not removed from each 
other anymore.  
Lastly, the burden of bringing harm and suffering to other human beings may be reduced by 
blaming or dehumanizing the victim: negative consequences may be construed as befalling 
members of deserving, subhuman groups and therefore do not need to raise moral concerns (cf. 
Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1990). In intergroup conflict situations, it is common for the ingroup to be 
perceived as the only group of people characterized by typically human or exclusively human 
attributes, whereas such secondary emotions as affection, admiration, pride, conceit, or nostalgia 
are not attributed to the outgroup (Haslam, 2006; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 
2007). In extreme cases, such devaluation can lead to moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990). So long 
as people feel some sense of collective responsibility, the awareness that one’s group has harmed 
an outgroup in the past may be enough to reduce associations of uniquely human characteristics 
with the outgroup (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006).  
Bandura (1991, 1999) proposed that mechanisms of moral disengagement are of relevance in 
cases of competing motivations where the implicit cost-benefit-calculations preceding behavior 
return that it would be more costly to be moral than to bend one’s standards in the pursuit of 
one’s wants. Highlighting the driving force of self-interest, moral disengagement may therefore 
be particularly relevant to instances in which one’s own interests are pitched against those of 
another (cf., interest morality; Batson, 2011) – in cases of extraordinary immoral behavior as 
much as in instances of everyday immorality.   
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Indeed, research on moral disengagement has linked self-exonerative reasoning consistent 
with moral disengagement to behaviors like interpersonal aggression and delinquent conduct, 
war support, carrying out the death penalty, animal cruelty, and (un)ethical decision making 
(Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; Detert, Trevino, 
& Sweitzer, 2008; Grussendorf, McAlister, Sandstrom, Udd, &Morrison, 2002; Jackson & 
Gaertner, 2011; McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006; Osofsky, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2005; 
Vollum, Buffington-Vollum, & Longmire, 2004). However, most studies cited are based on 
correlational data and self-report measures of moral disengagement, some of which were taken 
after people had already engaged in the immoral action (Osofsky et al., 2005, for example, 
measured reports from officers having worked in the death row system anywhere from 1-31 
years).  
 
The research gap: A dearth of experimental research on moral disengagement and neglect of 
temporal specifications of the theory 
 
For as much research as has been generated by the theory of moral disengagement, there is 
little or no published experimental research. Two notable exceptions are recent studies by Shu, 
Gino, & Bazerman (2011) and Hartmann & Vorderer (2010). The latter somewhat successfully 
manipulated disengagement mechanisms in the context of violent video games. The authors 
showed that violence against a virtual opponent led to less negative affect and guilt if the 
opponent had committed a previous condemnable action and was portrayed as less human. The 
same results were true of manipulations that depict a player’s violence as serving a good purpose 
and as having no audible and visible negative consequences. This research is informative in that 
it shows that the kind of cognitive restructuring proposed by Bandura has the potential to reduce 
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negative affect in the context of violent behavior. However, the study does not allow for testing 
the idea that participants actively generate cognitions in line with disengagement mechanisms 
when faced with the moral dilemma of wanting to uphold a standard while also wanting to reap 
rewards as a result of violating the standard. Shu et al. (2011) provide such a situation that 
highlights personal rewards from potential immoral action in the context of academic dishonesty 
and cheating, however, they conceptualize moral disengagement as a consequence of immoral 
action. Although it is very plausible (and evident in their research) that self-exonerative cognitive 
restructuring can be a consequence of immoral behavior, the theory suggests that disengagement 
happen in anticipation of such behavior, hereby enabling immoral conduct. A standard that is 
ordinarily embraced is selectively “deactivated” when the behavior proves more beneficial than 
costly for the self: 
People often experience conflicts where behavior they personally devalue can 
serve as the means for securing valued benefits. As long as self-sanctions override 
the force of external inducements, behavior is kept in line with personal standards. 
However, in the face of strong external inducements, such conflicts are often 
resolved by selective disengagement of self-sanctions. This enables otherwise 
considerate people to perform self-serving activities that have detrimental social 
effects. (Bandura, 1990, p. 28) 
Assessing such endorsement of a standard in the absence of self-interest, and the temporal 
aspect of disengagement seem to have largely been dismissed as a formality by extant research 
on moral disengagement. Post-hoc justification of attitude-inconsistent behavior is well-
documented in psychological research (e.g., Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Festinger, 1957; Festinger & 
Carlsmith, 1959) and so it seems prudent to pursue the question of whether justification 
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mechanisms may, in fact, operate anticipatorily, as well. However, this question of whether the 
anticipation of injurious behavior leads to self-exonerative reasoning and the disengagement of 
moral standards has yet to be tested. 
 
Suggesting a new paradigm for the experimental study of moral disengagement 
 
In light of this, a research paradigm is needed that (a) shows that a moral standard is 
endorsed in the abstract, but (b) anticipated self-benefits provide sufficient enticement to violate 
the standard (c) can assess pre-behavioral disengagement of the standard, and (d) permits 
manipulation of conditions necessary for disengagement.   More specifically, a standard is 
needed that is widely held and can easily be activated. In the abstract (when participants cannot 
benefit from violating the standard), this standard should be endorsed. However, a sufficiently 
strong enticement to violate the standard should create exactly the kind of internal dilemma that 
Bandura suggests can motivate moral disengagement.  
To create such a situation, I borrowed from dictator-game-paradigms to create an allocation 
paradigm that provides an opportunity to violate a fairness standard. Participants believed they 
and another participant were partaking in a study on group decision-making in which the 
members didn’t know each other and couldn’t interact with each other (in reality, only one 
participant was in the lab). The participant was told that the session involved an allocation task 
and eventually every participant was assigned to be the decision maker (for the participant this 
was framed in such a way that made it less obvious that every participant would be the decision 
maker, of course): 10 raffle tickets needed to be allocated between the (ostensibly) two 
participants. This could be done in any possible combination and neither the other participant nor 
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the experimenter would find out how the allocation was made. The tickets were entered into a 
raffle for a $100 Target gift card. A drawing was conducted a few times during the semester.  
 
The Present Research 
 
The goal of the present research is to test the tenets of moral disengagement theory using the 
allocation paradigm. Specifically, the present research seeks to address the following questions: 
1. Are participants aware of the fairness standard and do they endorse it in the abstract 
(i.e., when no personal gains are expected from violating the standard)?  
2. Is the gift card perceived as a desired end (if it is not desired it is unlikely that 
participants would risk violating a moral standard to get the card)? 
3. When put in the actual role of the decision-maker, do participants violate the 
fairness standard? 
4. Assuming that some violate the fairness standard, do they disengage this standard 
ahead of their behavior?  
5. How do participants feel about their behavior afterwards? 
 
Predictions derived from moral disengagement theory state that a well-recognized and 
endorsed standard is either adhered to (i.e., no moral violation takes place), or disengaged when 
personal benefits can be expected from violating the behavior. Disengagement should be 
expressed as pre-behavioral restructuring of a moral code, making unfair behavior seem fair. 
Moreover, if the standard is disengaged, the feelings following one’s immoral behavior should 
show a lack of guilt, shame, and remorse and a sense that the individual didn’t do anything 
wrong.   
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The above questions and predictions were tested across four studies: Study 1 examined 
whether participants perceived the gift card to be desirable and whether they identified the 
fairness standard in the present paradigm as giving 5 tickets to self and 5 tickets to other. Study 2 
investigated whether participants would deviate from the fair allocation when put in the role of 
the decision makers themselves. Study 3 manipulated whether participants were asked to indicate 
their understanding of a fair allocation either before or after learning that they would be the 
allocator. With self-interest introduced early for half the participants, this design allowed me to 
test whether the participants who knew of their role would adjust the fairness judgment in their 
favor in anticipation of behavior and to further test whether these pre-behavioral fairness 
judgments would predict actual behavior. If disengagement was a process at work, those who 
had an opportunity to adjust the fairness standard ahead of time should favor themselves more 
than those who did not have an opportunity to adjust the standard. Because moral disengagement 
is a deliberate process that takes time, Study 4 manipulated the amount of time participants had 
to disengage before making their decision, and assessed subsequent behavior. To the extent to 
which the desirability of the gift card motivated self-exonerative reasoning, time to think should 
allow for disengagement and more self-favoring behavior. To see how participants felt about 
their behavior afterwards, Studies 2-4 additionally assessed participants’ post-behavioral feelings 




To test whether the allocation paradigm is suitable for studying moral disengagement 
processes, it is important to know that participants are aware of and apply the fairness standard. 
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If so, when participants are not actually in the position of making the allocation, most should 
indicate that the fair way to assign ten tickets among two participants is giving each participant 
five tickets. Furthermore, it is important to know that participants identify the gift card as 




Participants and procedure. Seventy-six undergraduate students enrolled in Abnormal 
Psychology (n=69, 55 females, 12 males, 2 no gender identified) and Statistics (n=7, 4 females, 3 
males) were presented with the allocation procedure as a hypothetical decision and asked to 
indicate the number of tickets allocated to self and other that, in their view, would be moral and 
fair. In this study, participants were told that the gift card was for $10 and that a winner would be 
drawn at the end of each session (i.e., 5 tickets would directly translate into a 50% chance of 
winning the gift card). Participants were asked to rate the desirability of the gift card on a scale 
from 1 (not at all desirable) to 7 (extremely desirable). Three students were excluded from 




Fairness and morality judgments. Of the remaining 73 students, 60 (82%) said the moral 
and fair way to allocate the tickets was 5 for self, 5 for other; 5 (7 %) said 5-5 was fair, but the 
moral thing was to give the other more tickets than the self; 2 students (3%) said it was moral 
and fair to give the other more tickets; 4 (6%) said 5-5 was moral, but it was fair to favor the self; 
and 1 person each (1%) said favoring the self was fair and moral or 5-5 was fair, but favoring the 
self was moral.  
 
11 
Desirability of gift card. In this study, the gift card was seen as rather desirable (M=5.3, 
SD = 1.1; 1=not at all desirable, 7=extremely desirable). Two participants did not indicate how 
desirable the card was to them. Responses of the remaining 71 participants ranged from 2 to 7 
with 61 (86%) of the participants indicating that the card was desirable by choosing 5 or higher. 
Two males (2.8%) indicated the gift card was not desirable (assigning a desirability rating of 2). 





Study 1 was designed to assess the awareness of the fairness standard and the desirability 
of the gift card. In order for disengagement to occur, a standard has to be endorsed in the 
abstract, so that it may be disengaged when a sufficiently enticing opportunity promises to yield 
more personal benefits than costs. To assess whether these conditions had been met by the 
present paradigm, participants were presented with the allocation procedure as a hypothetical 
scenario and asked to identify the fairness standard and whether the prospect of immediately 
winning a $10 gift card would be perceived as desirable. At least in the current sample, the 
procedural fairness standard was easily accessible. Only two of 73 participants thought it was 
moral to prefer the self; the vast majority (71 participants or 97%) indicated that a moral choice 
would be to act fairly or to favor the other. Similarly, 65 participants (89%) indicated that giving 
five tickets to each participant would be fair – a clear indication that the fairness standard is 
salient and easily recalled.  
However, the desirability of the gift card ranged from 2 to 7 (2 males and 1 female 
indicated the gift card was not desirable) and it was more appealing to females than males. 
Although overall the gift card was rather desirable, it seems that there is potential to make the 
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card even more appealing. Study 2 addressed this problem in addition to providing participants 
with an opportunity to adhere to (or violate) the fairness standard by putting them in the actual 
decision making situation.  
 
Study 2 
Moral disengagement theory posits that we endorse moral standards in the abstract, but if 
people can expect considerable personal gains, they may adjust their standard so as to enable 
them to violate the standard in order to increase personal benefits. Study 1 demonstrated that the 
fairness standard is easily accessible when no personal gain is expected. Will the same 
endorsement of the standard be observed when participants can benefit from violating it? Study 2 
set out to address this by putting participants directly into the position of making the allocation 




Participants and procedure. 21 undergraduate students (10 females, 11 males) participated in 
exchange for course credit in an Introductory Psychology class. Participants were brought into 
the lab and run one-at-a-time by a same-sex research assistant to minimize cross-gender 
presentational concerns. Participants believed they were taking part in a study on how group 
members make decisions that have the potential to affect others in the absence of an opportunity 
to interact with another group member. With the exception of attaining informed consents and 
debriefing the participants, the experiment was run on MediaLab (for a copy of all instructions 
and prompts in order of presentation please see the Appendix) and participants didn’t interact 
with a research assistant. Before making the allocation, all participants were asked how much 
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they would like to win the gift card (1=not at all; 7=extremely). Because participants in Study 1 
had indicated that a $10 gift card paid out at the end of every session was only moderately 
desirable, this study offered a $100 gift card to be drawn once a month. Participants were then 
asked to make their allocation decision by assigning themselves anywhere from 0 to 10 tickets; 
the other participant would automatically get however many of the 10 tickets the allocator did 
not give to self. Participants were told that neither the other participant not the experimenter 
would learn of the decision. 
Once participants had made their allocation, they were asked to rate how moral, then how 
fair their decision was (both on a scale from 1=not at all fair/moral; 7= extremely fair/moral), 
and how they felt about their decision (sample items include justified, guilty, ashamed, happy; all 
on a scale from 1=not at all to 7=extremely). Finally, they were asked to provide some 
demographic information before signaling to the experimenter that they had concluded the 





Desirability of gift card. Ratings of the desirability of the gift card ranged from 4 to 7. The 
mean desirability rating of winning the gift card was 6.4 (SD=.93). The desirability did not vary 
by sex (F(1,19)=1.2, p=.30). Comparing the desirability of the gift card across Study 1 and Study 
2 confirmed that the $100 gift card in Study 2 was seen as more desirable than the $10 gift card 
in Study 1, F(1,88)=26.2, p<.001.  
Mean number of tickets allocated to self. Out of our 21 participants, 10 (48%; 4 females, 6 
males) allocated 5 tickets to self and 5 tickets to other, 10 (48%; 5 males and 5 females) favored 
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themselves, and 1 female (4%) favored the other (for histograms displaying the ticket allocations 
by gender, please see Figure 1). These numbers are in stark contrast to the percentages of 
participants in Study 1 who indicated that an equal allocation was fair and moral. More 
specifically, when participants were put into the position of the decision maker, they allocated an 
average of 6.5 tickets to themselves. Allocations did not vary by sex (F(1,19)=.02, p=.88). 
However, the mean allocation to self in this study was significantly higher than what 
participants in Study 1 indicated would be fair and moral in the abstract, t(20)=3.24, p=.002. 
When self-interest was at stake, the participants in this study found it difficult to adhere to the 
fairness norm endorsed in the abstract.  
Post-behavioral ratings of fairness and morality. How did participants rate their own 
actions? On average, the participants in this study perceived their actions to be more fair and 
moral than unfair or immoral (average ratings of post-behavioral fairness: M=4.8, SD=2.5; 
average rating of post-behavioral morality: M=5.0, SD=2.1). Post-behavioral ratings of both 
fairness and morality did not vary by sex (both Fs<.60). However, those who acted fairly or 
favored the other self-identified their behavior as both more moral (M=6.6) and more fair 
(M=6.2) than those who favored themselves (Mmoral= 3.1, Mfair=3.2), F(1,19)=58.04, p=.001 
(moral) and F(1,19)=11.8, p<.01 (fair). It seems participants rightly identified their actions as 
immoral and unjust if they favored themselves. This is also reflected in the correlation of 
numbers of tickets awarded to self with morality ratings (r=-.79, p<.001) and fairness ratings 
(r=-.61, p<.01). Generally, ratings fairness and morality were highly correlated, indicating that 
participants’ idea of fairness and morality overlap, but not to the extent to which they are 
synonymous with each other, r=.62, p<.01.  
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Emotional ratings. How did participants feel about their behavior? Those who favored 
themselves felt slightly more ashamed (M=2.0) and more guilty (M=2.6) afterward than those 
who acted fairly (means of both ashamed and guilty for those who acted fairly were 1.0 with no 
variability; hence, the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test was performed: Zashamed= 3.01, p=.01; Zguilty = 
4.57, p<.001). Those who favored themselves (M=1.7) did not feel more sorry than those who 
acted fairly or favored the other (M=1.2), F(1,19)=1.51, p=.24. The same is true of happy: 
Favoring oneself (M=4.6) did not make participants any more or less happy than acting fairly 
(M=5.2), F(1,19)=1.1, p=.32. However, those who favored the other or acted fairly felt more 
justified (M=5.5) than those who favored themselves (M=4.1), F(1,19)=5.43, p=.03. The more 
tickets participants allocated to self the more ashamed (r=.39, p=.08) and guilty (r=.41, p=.07) 
they felt. Number of tickets allocated to self did not reliably predict feeling happy, sorry, or 




Study 2 was designed to see whether participants would deviate from the easily identified 
and widely held fairness norm when violating the norm would provide an opportunity to reap 
personal benefits. Specifically, participants were put into the role of the decision maker and 
given full control over how many tickets to allocate between themselves and an ostensible other 
(unknown) participant. The tickets would then be entered into a raffle for a $100 gift card to be 
drawn at several times during the semester. Allocating more tickets to oneself translated into 
entering more tickets in one’s name into the raffle.  
Though participants did not have full control over the outcome of winning the gift card (as 
was the case in Study 1, because 10 tickets in that situation would have translated into an 
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automatic win), the $100 gift card was seen as more desirable than the $10 gift card in Study 1.  
The desirability of the gift card was incentive enough for half of the participants in this study to 
violate the widely-held fairness norm in their favor and for participants in this study to allocate, 
on average, 1.5 more tickets to themselves than would be permissible by the fairness standard. 
Consistent with the tenets of moral disengagement theory, participants violated the moral 
standard that was endorsed in the abstract when they were the ones who could benefit from such 
a violation while incurring relatively little costs (they were told the other participant and the 
experimenter would not learn of their decision so as to minimize presentational concerns).  
Inconsistent with moral disengagement theory, however, is the fact that participants who 
favored themselves also identified their behavior as less moral and less fair. Though 
disengagement suggests that participants think of their behavior in favorable terms, it is possible 
that the current situation did not provide much of a “way out.” Perhaps participants saw little 
room to “spin” the fact that giving more than five tickets to self was not fair. Still, it is 
noteworthy that post-behavioral ratings of feeling justified, of morality and fairness were not at 
the bottom of the scale. In fact, they all were closer to the middle of the scale, indicating that 
participants did not condemn their behavior altogether. In line with recognizing their behavior 
was unfair, those who favored themselves felt worse about their previous behavior than did those 
who acted fairly or favored the other: they indicated feeling more ashamed and guilty and less 
justified. However, all of these ratings are rather low, indicating that even those who recognized 
their actions as immoral did not experience strong feelings of shame or guilt at all. Similar to the 
ratings of morality and fairness, this may be a byproduct of the situation (participants may have 
reasoned that favoring oneself on tickets is hardly as condemnable as some other immoral 
actions), or it may be a result of participants having justified their behavior. If such justification 
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occurred, the current study cannot address whether participants, in fact, reasoned that their unfair 
behavior was justified and fair in anticipation of their behavior, or whether they did so as a 
means of reducing possible dissonance. Study 3 tried to address this question by investigating 
whether participants “adjusted” their understanding of what was fair and moral in anticipation of 
the behavior. 
 
Study 3  
Overview and predictions. A central idea of moral disengagement theory is that standards 
that are endorsed in the abstract may be “shifted” in one’s favor if perceived benefits of immoral 
behavior promise to outweigh the costs. Moreover, this is proposed to happen in anticipation of 
the behavior. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that a fairness standard that was easily accessible and 
endorsed in the abstract was less likely to be endorsed when participants were given an 
opportunity to act in a way that could uphold the standard or violate it in the interest of 
maximizing potential personal gains. If moral disengagement is plausible, participants who are 
informed of their role as decision maker should proceed to employ self-exonerative reasoning 
leading to disengagement of a standard insofar as the action promises to be more beneficial than 
costly to the self. To test this, study 3 asked participants to indicate their understanding of what 
would be moral and fair before making the decision. I manipulated whether participants already 
knew of their role as decision maker at the time of this pre-behavioral judgment or not. Thus, 
there were two conditions to which participants were randomly assigned: 
In the role-unknown-condition, participants were introduced to the task at hand, but asked 
what the moral and fair allocation would be before learning that they would be the allocator (and 
thus before making the allocation), and again after having made their decision. 
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In the role-known-condition, participants were asked what the moral and fair allocation 
would be after learning that they would be the allocator (but before making the allocation), and 
again after having made their decision. 
It was expected that the pre-allocation ratings of morality and fairness of an allocation would 
differ across the two conditions in so far as it is true that people start to disengage a standard 
before the behavior, given that they expect the behavior will be more beneficial than costly. 
More specifically, it was expected that participants in the role-known-condition would “move the 
standard” in their favor before proceeding to the actual behavior, possibly allowing for more 
self-favoring allocations. Thus, relative to participants in the role-unknown-condition, those in 
the role-known-condition should show pre-allocation ratings that resemble self-favoring (i.e., 
indicate that more than 5 tickets to self are fair). Given the absence of self-interest at the time of 
pre-allocation ratings, participants in the role-unknown-condition should have no reason to shift 
the standard of fairness in their favor. As a result, those in the role-unknown-condition should 
subsequently adhere to the standard and act fairly, whereas the opportunity to adjust the standard 




Participants and procedure. 42 undergraduate students (19 females, 23 males) participated in 
exchange for course credit in an Introductory Psychology class. Participants were brought into 
the lab and run one-at-a-time by a same-sex research assistant to minimize cross-gender 
presentational concerns. The basic procedure was the same as that of Study 2. However, 
participants in the present study were asked to indicate what the fair and moral way to allocate 
the tickets would be before making their decision. They did so either before they knew they 
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would get to make the allocation (role-unknown-condition, n=22) or after learning about their 
role as the allocator (role-known-condition, n=20). They indicated what would be fair and moral 
by choosing a combination of possible ticket allocations for each item (combinations in each 




Desirability of gift card. Ratings of the desirability of the gift card ranged from 4 to 7. The 
mean desirability rating of winning the gift card was 6.6 (SD=.79). The desirability did not vary 
by condition or sex (all main effects and the interaction, Fs < .43, ps > .52). Apparently, the $100 
gift card was clearly desirable to the participants in this study. 
Ratings of fairness and morality prior to ticket allocation. Given that the gift card was 
desirable, what did participants indicate would be the fair and moral way to allocate the tickets? 
In the role-unknown-condition participants made their ratings of pre-behavioral morality and 
fairness before learning that they would be the decision-maker. Believing that they had a 50-50 
chance of being on the receiving end, ratings by participants in this condition should be very 
much in line with the fairness norm. On the other hand, participants in the role-known-condition 
made these ratings after they had learned of their assigned role. Enticed by the pull of the gift 
card, their judgments of what is fair and moral should already be tilted in their favor.  
Indeed, on the fairness item, a main effect of condition emerged: participants in the role-
unknown-condition deemed an average number of 4.6 tickets to self fair, while participants in the 
role-known-condition deemed an average number of 6.2 tickets to self fair, F(1,38) = 9.61, 
p<.01. Though participants in the role-unknown condition also indicated that giving fewer tickets 
to self would be moral (M=4.2) relative to role-known-condition (M=4.9), this difference was not 
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reliable, F(1,38)=1.45, p=.24. However, there was a condition x sex interaction such that females 
in the role-known-condition thought more tickets to self (M=5.6) were moral compared to the 
role-unknown-condition (M=3.6), F(1,38)=5.94, p<.05. For males, there was no reliable 
difference between the role-unknown-condition (M=4.8) and the role-known-condition (M=4.2), 
F(1,38)=.80, p=.38. Overall, pre-decisional judgments of fairness and pre-decisional judgments 
of morality were highly correlated in the role-unknown-condition (r=.73, p<.001), but not in the 
role-known-condition (r=.09, p=.71; for all correlations see Table 4). It seems participants 
differentiated between what was fair and moral when they knew they were going to have control 
over the ticket allocation, but not when there was a chance that someone else might make the 
allocation decision. Though in the abstract recognizing that 50-50 is the fair and moral way to 
allocate 10 tickets, when faced with the opportunity to favor oneself, the participants’ 
perceptions of fairness, but not morality, shifted in their favor. Moreover, females in particular 
thought that giving an average of 2 additional tickets to self was moral in the role-known-
condition (however, since females also indicated that it would be moral to give the self fewer 
tickets in the role-unknown-condition, this difference amounts to a deviation from the fairness 
norm by roughly one ticket).  
Another way to look at these judgments is to tally the pre-behavioral indications of what is 
fair and moral by condition. Out of 42 participants in the two conditions, 31 (74%) indicated that 
the fair and moral way to allocate the tickets would be 5-5. The only exceptions were 1 male in 
the role-unknown-condition who indicated the fair way to be 5-5 whereas the moral decision 
would be 3 tickets to self and 7 to other (exactly the decision he proceeded to make). Also in this 
condition, 3 females who acted fairly indicated that the fair and moral way to make this decision 
would have been to favor the other (only one said the fair decision would have been 5-5). 
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Nobody in the role-unknown-condition indicated before making the decision that it would be fair 
to favor oneself. Interestingly, however, 6/8 participants (75%) who later favored themselves in 
the role-known-condition indicated that the fair way to allocate the tickets would, in fact, be to 
favor oneself. 3 out of those 6 indicated that the moral way to allocate would be 5-5, 2 indicated 
that the moral way would be to favor oneself, and 1 indicated that the moral decision would be to 
favor the other. It appears as if 6/20 participants (30% ) in the role-known-condition adjusted the 
widely held fairness standard in their favor, knowing they would be the ones to allocate the 
tickets momentarily.  
Ticket allocation predicted by pre-behavioral ratings. Did the pre-behavioral ratings for 
fairness and morality predict the decision participants proceeded to make? As expected, 
indicating that more tickets to self would be fair predicted actually giving oneself more tickets in 
the role-known-condition (r=.83, p<.001), but not in the role-unknown-condition (r=.10, p=.65). 
For both conditions, there was no association between indicating what the moral decision would 
be and the actual behavior (both rs <.20, ps>.38). 
When looking at the correlations by condition and sex, pre-allocation judgments of morality 
positively predicted ticket allocations for females (r=.66, p=.05), but not males in the role-
known-condition (r=-.16, p=.65), but not in the role-unknown-condition (both rs=.32, ps>.30). 
So, how exactly did people allocate tickets? 
Mean number of tickets allocated to self. The mean number of tickets allocated to self did not 
vary by condition1 (F(1,38)= 1.30, p=.27), sex (F(1,38) = 0.05, p=.82) or condition x sex 
(F(1,38) = .68, p=.42). For mean allocations to self by condition and sex, please see Table 2. 
                                                 
 
1 When treating tickets allocated to self as a count variable and using Poisson regression to 
estimate the same model, the results do not change. 
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Among those who indicated in their pre-rating that favoring the self would be fair (i.e, giving 
more than 5 tickets to oneself would be fair; n=6), the pre-rating was perfectly correlated with 
the number of tickets allocated to self (r=1.0, p<.001; for all correlations among those who 
favored self, see Table 5, but note that these are based on a very small sample). Among those 
who indicated that the fair way to allocate would be to give 5 tickets or less to oneself (n=36), 
the pre-decisional rating of fairness did not predict actual ticket allocations (r=.08, p=.64).  
Percentages of other-favoring, fair, and selfish behavior. Another way to look at the 
allocation of tickets is to categorize the behavior as favoring the other (fewer than 5 tickets to 
self), fair (5 tickets to self), or selfish (more than 5 tickets to self) (also see Table 3). Calculating 
the percentages of other-favoring, fair, and selfish behavior by condition and sex yielded the 
following results: Among females, 80% (role-unknown-condition) and 78% (role-known-
condition), respectively acted fairly. Among males, 33% (role-unknown condition) and 45% 
(role-known condition) acted fairly. For all percentages, please see Table 3. Although it seems 
that there is a sex effect on behavior, estimating a cumulative logit model indicated that neither 
condition, sex, nor the interaction reliably predicted the three-level outcome (all Wald χ2 < 2.3, 
p>.13). The same is true of treating the outcome variable as binary (favoring self vs. being fair or 
favoring other; all Wald χ2 < 2.5, p>.12). Figure 2 depicts the number of tickets allocated to 
oneself in histograms by condition and gender.  
Using behavior as a three-level outcome variable, it is also possible to ask whether the odds 
of giving more tickets to oneself increased from what people said to what people did, and 
whether this varied by condition. Indeed, using a generalized estimating equation (GEE) for 
multinomial models revealed that such a difference existed (Wald χ2 = 3.5, p=.06 for the 
interaction of time of estimate and condition). Specifically, the odds of making a selfish 
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allocation were 9 times the odds of saying it was fair to favor oneself before the allocation in the 
role-unknown condition. In the role-known condition, the discrepancy between what people said 
and what they did was smaller: the odds of giving oneself more than five tickets were only 1.5 
times the odds of saying it was fair to give oneself more than five tickets. 
In sum, in both conditions, eight participants (or 36% of participants in the role-unknown-
condition and 40% of participants in the role-known-condition) favored themselves. In other 
words: even though not one of the participants in the role-unknown-condition said the fair or 
moral thing to do would be to allocate more tickets to self, eight participants proceeded to do so, 
going against the judgment they made only minutes prior. This behavior is not consistent with 
moral disengagement, which would suggest that one should adhere to a standard that was not 
disengaged. 
Ratings of fairness and morality after the ticket allocation. When comparing the post-
behavioral ratings of fairness and morality of one’s actions across the two conditions, no reliable 
differences between the conditions emerged (Fs for both measures <.60, ps>.50). A sex effect 
emerged on ratings of fairness of one’s actions, such that females rated their behavior as more 
fair (M=6.1) than males (M=4.4), F(1, 38)=5.96, p=.02. The same was true of morality 
judgments, though the sex effect was marginal, F(1,38)=3.66, p=.06. These sex effects remain 
when controlling for participants’ behavior by including the number of tickets allocated to self as 
a continuous covariate in the model. In addition, a condition main effect emerges on the fairness 
item indicating that participants in the role-known condition thought their behavior was more fair 
(M=5.8) than did participants in the role-unknown-condition (M=4.7), F(1,37)=6.5, p=.02. 
Perhaps more informative is a comparison of post-behavioral ratings of morality and fairness 
based on actual behavior: do those who favored themselves differ from those who favored other 
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or those who acted fairly? Indeed, such differences emerged: those who favored themselves rated 
their behavior as less moral (M=3.3) than those who acted fairly or favored the other (M=6.6), 
F(1,40)=73.1, p<.001 (also see Table 6). The same was true of fairness: Again, favoring oneself 
was clearly seen as less fair (M=2.8) than allocating tickets evenly or giving more to the other 
(M=6.6), F(1,40)=73.1, p<.001. This clearly indicates an understanding by our participants that 
allocating resources evenly is fair and moral and that favoring oneself is neither fair nor moral.  
Looking at post-behavioral judgments of morality and fairness by pre-behavioral ratings of 
fairness indicates that those who prior to making their allocation said giving more to the self 
would be fair (all of whom proceeded to favor themselves) indicated that their behavior was less 
fair (M=3.0) than did those who initially said giving 5 tickets or less to oneself was fair and who 
did not violate the fairness norm (M=6.6), F(1,30)=31.01, p<.001. The same was true of ratings 
of post-decisional morality: those who said initially favoring the self would be fair (and 
proceeded to do so), indicated afterwards that their behavior was less moral (M=3.5) than did 
those who initially said giving 5 tickets or less to self was fair (and adhered to that) (M=6.6), 
F(1,30)=31.6, p<.001. Furthermore, comparing those who initially said favoring the self would 
be fair (all of whom went on to favor themselves) to those who initially said giving five or more 
tickets to the other would be fair, but who also went on to favor themselves, revealed no 
differences in their post-behavioral ratings of fairness (Mpriorjustification=3.0, Mnopriorjustification=2.6; 
F(1,14)=.38, p=.55; also see Table 7) or morality (Mpriorjustification=3.5, Mnopriorjustification=3.2; 
F(1,14)=.15, p=.70). Thus, even though ahead of time six participants indicated that giving 
oneself more than five tickets could be fair, their post-behavioral judgments do not reflect such 
lenient fairness standards. Plausibly, these self-favorable judgments enabled these participants to 
favor themselves in their allocations. Still, given their post-behavioral judgments it appears as if 
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the fairness norm re-emerged in their thinking soon after the decision and there was no way for 
these six men and women to escape the fact that they had, in fact, not acted fairly. Had the 
standard been disengaged (in the role-known participants), this should have been reflected in 
their post-decisional ratings, particularly in comparison to those who did not have an opportunity 
to disengage the standard ahead of time (participants in the role-unknown-condition).  
Do allocations predict post-behavioral judgments of fairness and morality? For both 
conditions, allocating tickets to oneself was negatively related to post-behavioral judgments of 
morality (rcond1=-.73, p<.001; rcond2=-.66, p<.01) and fairness (rcond1=-.60, p<.01; rcond2=-.90, 
p<.001). Among those who indicated before making their decision that it is fair to favor oneself, 
post-decisional fairness ratings seemed to not be related to tickets allocated to self (n=6; r=-.30, 
p=.56; but this is based on a very small sample). However, when comparing those two 
correlations, they did not reliably differ from each other, Z=.63, p=.53. For those who indicated 
that it would be fair to give 5 tickets or less to oneself before making the decision, however, 
giving more tickets to self predicted lower post-decisional ratings of fairness (n=36; r=-.64, 
p<.001). 
Emotional responses. Participants were asked to rate their current emotional state for several 
adjectives on a scale from 1 (not at all) – 7 (extremely).  Emotions of interest in this particular 
setting were feelings of shame, guilt, justification, happiness, and feeling sorry. These ratings did 
not differ by condition (all Fs<1).  
A marginal sex effect emerged for ashamed such that males (M=2.0) were slightly more 
ashamed of their behavior than females (M=1.3), F(1,38)=3.43, p=.07. The same was true of 
guilty: men felt more guilty (M=2.4) than women (M=1.4), F(1,38)=5.1, p=.03. The interaction 
with condition was not significant for any outcome (all Fs<1.7). When controlling for actual 
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behavior by including tickets allocated to self as a continuous covariate in the model, the sex 
main effects remain for guilty and ashamed, and a sex x condition interaction emerges for 
justified, F(1,37)=5.5, p=.03. Decomposing this interaction indicates that females felt marginally 
more justified than males in the role-unknown-condition (F(1,38)=2.94, p=.10), but not the role-
known-condition, F(1,38)=.03, p=.87.  
Predicting affective responses from behavior2 indicated that those who favored themselves 
felt more guilty (F(1,40)=25.2, p<.001), ashamed (F(1,40)=3.7, p=.06), sorry (F(1,40)=14.6, 
p<.01), and less justified (F(1,40)=45.6, p<.001). There were no differences for happy 
(F(1,40)=.35, p=56). For all means and standard deviations, see Table 6. 
Instead of predicting emotions from a full crossing of sex, behavior, and condition (see 
footnote 2), it is possible to estimate separate 2-factor models crossing behavior with condition 
and sex. Doing so supported the main effects of behavior reported above. In addition, a condition 
x behavior interaction emerged for justified, F(1,38)= 4.0, p=.05: though in both conditions those 
who were fair felt more justified than those who favored themselves, this difference was more 
pronounced in condition 1 (Munfair= 3.3, Mfair=6.1) than in condition 2 (Munfair=4.0, Mfair=5.6).  
Comparing the emotional ratings of those who favored themselves and adjusted the fairness 
standard ahead of time to those who favored themselves but didn’t adjust the standard ahead of 
                                                 
 
2 Predicting emotional reactions from full crossings of sex, condition, and behavior (2-level 
variable) is problematic due to several cells with no variance (SD=0, e.g. there was no variability 





time showed no differences in any of the emotional ratings (all Fs<1.8, p>.20; for means and 
standard deviations, see Table 7). 
Although those who acted selfishly clearly indicate that they feel more negative afterwards 
than those who acted fairly or favored the other, given that the scale ranged from 1-7 it is 
important to note that these ratings are still very low overall and thus don’t suggest very strong 
negative reactions by the participants to their own transgressions. That said, there appears to be a 
tendency for those who did adjust the fairness norm ahead of time to feel even less negatively 
about their behavior than their counterparts who favored themselves a few minutes after 
indicating that an even allocation would be fair. Perhaps understandably, the latter participants’ 
reactions resemble dissonance whereas the former participants don’t have to deal with the 
discrepancy of what they said and what they did. 
Correlations of behavior with emotions. Correlations support these findings: the more tickets 
participants allocated to themselves, the more sorry (r=.46, p<.01), ashamed (r=.26, p=.09), and 
guilty (r=.51, p<.01), but the less justified (r=-.60, p<.001) participants felt. Tickets allocated to 
self were not related to feelings of happiness (r=-.17, p=.29). Among those who indicated before 
making their allocation that it would be fair to give more than 5 tickets to oneself (all of whom 
were in condition 2), behavior is not correlated with feeling guilty, ashamed justified, happy, or 
sorry (see Table 5; all ps>.19; however, the values of some correlations suggest rather substantial 
relationships). Among those who indicated initially that it would be fair to give 5 tickets or less 
to oneself, allocations do predict emotional responses such that more tickets allocated to self 
predicted feeling less justified (r=-.56, p<.001), more guilty (r=.55, p<.001), more ashamed 







Similar to Study 2, this third study brought participants into the lab and put them into the 
“hot seat” of actually having to make a decision in which they could maximize their personal 
chances of winning a gift card (at the expense of violating a widely held moral norm), or they 
could act in accordance with the standard and, in turn, reduce their chances of winning a highly 
desirable gift card.  
In contrast to Study 2, however, some participants were asked to indicate what the fair and 
moral decision would be before learning of their role (role-unknown-condition), while others 
were asked after they had learned of their role (role-known-condition). All were asked to rate the 
fairness and morality of their actions after making an allocation.  
Though no differences in the number of tickets allocated to self emerged across the two 
conditions, the pre-allocation ratings of morality and fairness did, indeed, differ across 
conditions. On average, participants in the role-known-condition thought it was fair to give 
themselves 6.2 tickets, whereas participants in the role-unknown-condition thought the fair way 
to allocate tickets would be to keep slightly less than half of the tickets (4.6) for themselves. 
More specifically, six out of eight participants who favored themselves in the role-known-
condition clearly adjusted their definition of fairness and morality before allocating tickets in 
their favor. Assuming that “thinking is for doing”, these participants may, in fact, have 
momentarily disengaged their standard to enable them to favor themselves.  
Inconsistent with moral disengagement is the fact that these participants showed in their 
immediate post-behavioral ratings of fairness and morality that they knew they had violated a 
standard for they judged their own actions more harshly than did those who acted fairly or 
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favored others. One would assume if the standard had been disengaged participants wouldn’t 
think of what they did as morally wrong. Also inconsistent with the idea of disengagement is the 
fact that the rate of those who favored themselves in the role-unknown-condition did not differ 
from that in the role-known-condition, although there was no shifting of the fairness norm in 
one’s favor in the role-unknown-condition. Not knowing on which side of the “allocation fence” 
they would fall, these participants clearly indicated that the fair thing would be to divide the 
tickets evenly (if not slightly in favor of the other), only to override these judgments once they 
found out they would allocate the tickets and proceed to violate the fairness standard at the same 
rate as those who had the opportunity to “adjust” the standard ahead of time. Once self-interest 
entered the situation participants started to act in their own favor – regardless of whether the 
standard was disengaged or not. Of course, it is possible that these participants very briefly 
disengaged the standard once they found out they were the allocator (which would not be 
captured by the current design). However, there was little time and opportunity for them to do so 
and the standard is clearly active in their post-behavioral judgments. It seems more plausible that 
these participants favored themselves despite the knowledge that they were about to violate the 
very norm they had just reiterated. Perhaps it was a matter of “following the gut” now and 
dealing with the aftermath, if necessary, later. Alternatively, it is possible that participants 
experienced negative affect in anticipation of their moral violation, but then overrode this 
negative affect with higher order thinking, motivated by self-protection. Work by Valdesolo & 
DeSteno (2008) is inconsistent with the former, but consistent with the latter possibility: when 
their participants were hindered from engaging in reasoning after favoring themselves, they rated 
their own behavior no fairer than that of another. Without cognitive constraint, however, a self-
favorable bias emerged in post-behavioral judgments of participant’s own and someone else’s 
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identical action. If self-favorable attitudes towards one’s own transgressions had been activated 
automatically, a cognitive load should not have eliminated the effect, Valdesolo & DeSteno 
argue. Elimination of self-favorable biases in post-decision judgments seems more consistent 
with an explanation that focuses on volitionally-guided post-behavioral justifications. As alluded 
to previously, the current data cannot rule out the possibility that such motivated reasoning may 
not only alter post-decision judgments, but may also enter into the pre-decisional period. Such 
higher order thinking necessitates cognitive resources and time. Indeed, moral disengagement is 
predicted to be a controlled process in which people actively restructure the behavior they are 
motivated to employ. By that logic, providing participants with the temptation of the gift card in 
light of a clearly accessible standard and providing ample time to think should have the potential 
to result in self-exonerative reasoning consistent with moral disengagement and, hence, more 
self-favoring. Study 4 explicitly addressed this time component.  
 
Study 4 
Overview and predictions. Even though Study 3 provided little support for moral 
disengagement, it is possible (though unlikely) that participants in the role-unknown-condition 
adjusted their judgments once they learned of their role, enabling them to favor themselves. 
Similarly, it is possible that (some) participants in Study 3 sped through the study, not allowing 
time for disengagement. Therefore, Study 4 aimed to manipulate the amount of time participants 
had to deliberate. Also, to avoid locking people into a decision by making a pre-decision rating 
of fair and moral behavior, Study 4 briefly embedded mention of the fairness standard in the pre-
decisional instructions or not. This resulted in a 2 (standard salient: yes vs. no) x 2 (time to think: 
yes vs. no) between-subjects design. Insofar as time is needed to disengage a salient standard 
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before a behavior, the time manipulation should have provided participants with opportunity to 
generate self-exonerative reasoning. In this situation, a moral ought was made salient, a situation 
was provided that lead most participants to consider violating this standard, and participants were 
provided the opportunity to spend their time and cognitive resources on self-exonerative 
reasoning in line with moral disengagement to pave the way for self-favoring behavior. In other 
words: Study 4 was designed as another opportunity for moral disengagement to reveal itself.  
If these conditions really provide fertile ground for moral disengagement and disengagement 
is a process likely to be seen in those who want to favor themselves, a time main effect would be 
expected such that more selfish behavior should result from having time to think. Alternatively, 
since a standard can only be disengaged if it is activated, an interaction may be expected such 
that disengagement occurs when people have time to think, but only once a standard has been 
made salient. This is especially true if the standard is not clear. However, given the very 
transparent and unambiguous situation, it is likely that the standard is obvious, even without 
activation. If the latter is true, an interaction is less likely since the standard should be salient 
regardless of our manipulation. It is also possible that highlighting the standard encourages more 
moral behavior (it may be difficult to ignore or turn off something that is likely fairly obvious to 




Participants and procedure. 96 undergraduate students (48 females, 48 males) participated in 
exchange for course credit in an Introductory Psychology class. The cover story and basic 
procedure were the same as in Studies 2 and 3. The instructions were altered slightly to reflect 
the change in manipulations. Specifically, to make the standard salient, participants were told in 
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the pre-allocation instructions that “most people think the fairest way to divide the tickets is 
evenly, giving 5 tickets to oneself and 5 to the other person, but how you choose to divide them 
is entirely up to you.” This statement was omitted from instructions for participants who did not 
receive a salience manipulation. To manipulate time to think, participants in the time conditions 
were told:  
Some of our participants have found it helpful to be given some time to think 
about their decision. You may take the next few moments to do so. The screen will 
automatically prompt you to make your allocation in a few minutes. However, 
after you see the prompt, you may take as much time as you need before entering 
your allocation.  
So, take a few moments to think about how you want to divide the tickets, then, 
after you see the prompt and are ready, enter your allocation.  
The screen then “froze” for 2 minutes (participants were never told of the exact time). Once the 
time to think had passed, the screen changed and automatically directed participants to the next 
screen, prompting them to make their allocation (all instructions and prompts in order of 
presentation can be found in the Appendix). Participants in the no-time conditions did not read 
the above instructions. They were prompted directly to indicate their decision. The post-decision 
questionnaire was identical to that in Studies 2 and 3 with the exception of an added item, 
prompting participants to write a few sentences, telling us “what thoughts went through your 
mind between (a) when you learned that you would allocate the tickets and (b) when you 
indicated your allocation decision on the computer.  Which of these thoughts affected your 






Desirability of gift card. Ratings of the desirability of the gift card ranged from 4 to 7. The 
mean desirability rating of winning the gift card was 6.5 (SD=.97). The desirability did not vary 
by condition or sex (all main effects and the interaction, Fs ≤ 1.08, ps > .30). Hence, the gift card 
was again clearly desirable to the participants in the present study. 
Effects of time and salience manipulations on mean number of tickets allocated to self. 
Predicting the number of tickets allocated from time, salience, and participant sex indicated that 
there was a marginal effect of time such that those who had time to think allocated fewer tickets 
to themselves (M=6.0) than did those who had no time to think (M=6.7), F(1,88)=3.51, p=.06.  
There were no main effects of standard salience (F(1,88) = .13, p=.73), or sex (F(1,88) = 0.93, 
p=.34). None of the 2-way interactions reached statistical significance, either (all F(1,88) < .93, 
p>.34). However, a 3-way interaction emerged (F(1,88) = 7.21, p<.01). Decomposing this 
interaction indicated that the time x salience interaction was significant for males (F (1,88) = 
4.93, p=.03), but not females (F (1,88) = 2.48, p=.12). Decomposing the 2-way interaction for 
males indicted that when the standard was salient, males allocated fewer tickets to self when they 
had time to think (M=4.8) than when they did not have time to think (M=6.9), (F (1,88) = 6.4, 
p=.01). No such difference occurred when the standard was not made salient for men (Ms= 6.2 
and 6.9; F(1,88) = .37, p=.55)3. Although this effect was not reliable in the current sample, a 
trend in the current study suggests that time to think actually decreased number of tickets 
allocated to self. For men, this was only true when the standard was made salient. In both cases, 
                                                 
 
3 When treating tickets allocated to self as a count variable and estimating the model using 




this is contrary to what we would expect if participants needed (and used) time before making a 
decision to disengage moral standards, enabling them to act more selfishly.  For mean allocations 
to self by condition and sex, please see Table 8.  
Another way to look at the behavior is to predict selfish, fair, or other-favoring behavior from 
time to think, salience of standard, and participants’ sex in an ordered logistic regression model. 
Consistent with the previous, time predicted behavior (Wald χ2 (1, N=96) = 5.8, p=.02) such that 
the less time participants had, the more they allocated to self. Also, the three-way interaction 
previously reported emerged, (Wald χ2 (1, N=96) = 5.1, p=.02). No other effects reached 
significance. 
Lastly, I regressed the two manipulations and participant sex onto a binary outcome 
(combining those who acted fairly and those who favored the other as having acted morally). The 
results were consistent with the previous analyses. 
Percentages of favoring other, fair, and selfish behavior. Similar to Study 3, it may be 
informative to tally for each condition the percentage of male and female participants who made 
a decision to favor the other, act fairly, or favor the self. In each of the two conditions in which 
participants were given time to think 33% of participants favored themselves. In the two 
conditions in which participants did not have time to think, 50% (without a salience 
manipulation) and 58% (with a salience manipulation) favored themselves, reflecting the trend of 
time to reduce ticket allocations to self (for all percentages please see Table 9). Figure 3 displays 
histograms for the number of tickets allocated to self by condition and sex. 
Ratings of fairness and morality of behavior. Does the number of tickets allocated to self 
predict post-behavioral judgments? Indeed, the more tickets participants allocated to themselves, 
the less moral (r=-.76, p<.001) and the less fair (r=-.74, p<.01) they rated their own actions 
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afterwards. Ratings of morality and fairness were highly correlated, r=.88, p<.001 (for all 
correlations of ticket allocation, ratings of morality, fairness, and emotions, please see Table 11). 
In line with these findings, participants who favored themselves rated this behavior as less moral 
(M=3.2) and less fair (M=2.7) than those who acted fairly or favored the other (Mmoral=6.4; 
Mfair=6.5), Fmoral(1, 94)=168.01, p<.001, Ffair(1,94)=160.8, p<.001. 
Predicting participants’ ratings of post-behavioral morality and fairness from a full crossing 
of the two manipulations and participants’ sex revealed a marginal main effect of time to think 
for moral judgments such that those who did have time to think rated their behavior as more 
moral (M=5.3) than those who did not have time to think (M=4.6), F(1,88)=2.88, p=.09. There 
were no effects on the fairness item. When controlling for participants’ actual behavior4 by 
including behavior as a continuous covariate, however, the time effect on the morality item 
completely disappeared, F(1,87)=0.2, p=.70. However, a 3-way interaction emerged, 
F(1,87)=4.42, p=.04. Decomposing this interaction revealed a significant 2-way interaction of 
time x salience for males (F(1,87)=5.66, p=.02), but not females (F(1,87)=.41, p=.52). Further 
decomposing the 2-way interaction for males indicated that they rated their behavior as more 
moral when they had had time to think (M=5.6) rather than no time to think (M=4.4), but only if 
the standard had not been made salient, F(1,87)=5.44, p=.02. The same was true for the fairness 
item: a marginal 3-way interaction emerged, F(1,87)=3.31, p=.07. Decomposing this interaction 
revealed a significant 2-way interaction of time x salience for males (F(1,87)=5.85, p=.03), but 
not females (F(1,87)=.03, p=.85). Further decomposing the 2-way interaction for males indicated 
                                                 
 
4 As in Study 3, including behavior as a 2 or 3-level variable in the model led to data-analytical 




that they rated their behavior as fairer when they had had time to think (M=5.1) rather than no 
time to think (M=4.7), but only if the standard had been made salient, F(1,87)=4.91, p=.03.  
Because a full crossing of behavior with all manipulations and sex is not possible, additional 
models were estimated crossing behavior (fair /unfair) with each of the independent variables 
separately. In each of these 2-factor analyses, only behavior predicted fairness and morality 
judgments in line with previously reported findings (those who acted fairly or favored the other 
rated their behavior as more fair and moral than did those who favored self). Across analyses, 
neither salience, time, sex or any of the 2-way interactions were predictive, all Fs<2.5. Looking 
at all possible 3-factor models including behavior (time, sex, behavior and salience, sex, 
behavior and time, salience, behavior) in the same way revealed the same patterns: only behavior 
predicted post-behavioral fairness and morality; none of the 2-way or 3-way interactions were 
significant, all Fs< 2.3 It was not possible to estimate effects for post-behavioral fairness for a 2 
(salience: high vs. low) x 2 (behavior: fair vs. unfair) x 2 (sex: male vs. female) model due to 
females who acted fairly and for whom the standard was made salient (n=11) all indicating their 
behavior was extremely fair (M=7.0).  
Predicting emotional reactions from behavior. The more tickets were allocated to self the 
more participants reported feeling sorry (r=.52, p<.001), ashamed (r=.46, p<.001), and guilty 
(r=.61, p<.001) and the less they reported feeling justified (r=-.41, p<.001). Ticket allocations 
did not predict feeling happy (r= -.13, p=.22). These patterns hold across all conditions with one 
exception: When participants had neither time to think, nor the standard made salient to them 
(condition 4), allocating more tickets to self predicted feeling less happy, r=-.51, p<.02. Overall, 
this reiterates that participants recognized that favoring themselves was a violation of the fairness 
standard and they felt worse the further from the standard they deviated in their own interest.  
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Further reiterating these findings, there were reliable mean differences on all emotional 
ratings (except for happy) between those who favored themselves and those who acted fairly or 
favored the other, indicating that favoring oneself left participants feeling more guilty, ashamed 
sorry, and less justified (see Table 10 for means and standard deviations). 
Effects of manipulations on emotional reactions
5
. 
                                                 
 
5 As in previous analyses, including behavior in these analyses as a factor resulted in problems. 
8/16 cells in a time (yes vs. no) x standard salience (yes vs. no) x behavior (self vs. fair/other) x 
sex (male vs. female) between-subjects design, had several items without any variance. These 
items were: 
Condition 1 (time and standard salient): all 6 females who acted fairly indicated that their 
behavior was extremely fair (M=7.0, SD=0); all 10 males who acted fairly indicated that they felt 
no shame whatsoever (M=1.0, SD=0). 2 males who acted selfishly indicated that they didn’t feel 
any shame or guilt (M=1.0 and SD=0 on both items) 
Condition 2 (no time, standard salient): 5 females and 5 males who acted fairly indicated their 
behavior was extremely fair (M=7.0, SD=0 for both males and females); 5 men who acted fairly 
additionally indicated that they were not at all guilty, ashamed, or sorry (all Ms=1.0, SD=0).  
Condition 3 (time, standard not salient): 9 females who acted fairly indicated that they felt not at 
all ashamed (M=1.0, SD=0) and 7 males who acted fairly indicated that their actions were 
entirely fair (M=7.0, SD=0) and they did not feel guilty (M=1.0, D=0). 
Condition 4 (no time, standard not salient): 5 females who acted fairly indicated that their 




Justified. A time effect emerged indicating that those who had time to think (M=5.4) felt 
more justified than those who did not have time to think (M=4.7), F(1,88)= 5.3, p=.02. 
Furthermore, males (M=5.4) reported feeling marginally more justified than females (M=4.8), 
F(1,88)=3.7, p=.06. When including behavior as a continuous covariate, both effects were 
reduced: time to think, F(1,87)=2.74,p=.10;  sex, F(1,87)=2.72, p=.10. No other reliable 
predictors emerged.  
When predicting feelings of justification from all possible two- and three-factor models as 
described above, the same behavior, time and sex main effects emerged. Additionally, a time x 
behavior interaction consistently emerged indicating that among those who favored themselves 
participants with time to think felt more justified (M=4.8) than participants who did not have 
time to think (M=3.7), F(1,27.3)=4.6, p=.04. No such difference occurred for those who were 
fair or favored the other (both Ms=5.8), F(1, 41.3)=.04, p=.85. However, this was further 
qualified by a 3-way interaction with standard salience F(1,88)=3.3, p=.08, indicating that the 
former only held for those for whom the standard was salient, F(1,34.8)=7.8, p=.01 and not for 
those for whom the standard was not made salient, F(1,24.1)=0, p=.98. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The problem was dealt with by controlling for behavior by entering it as a continuous 
covariate and also by running all possible 2- and 3-factor models including behavior and the 
independent variables (2-factor models: time and behavior, salience and behavior, sex and 
behavior; 3-factor models: time, salience, behavior, time, sex, behavior, salience, sex, behavior). 
None of the latter analyses encountered the problem of zero variance in a cell. To account for 
heterogeneity of variance, the Welch-Satterthwaite adjustment was used in all follow-up tests. 
 
39 
Guilty. Consistent with the previous analyses, those who had time to think felt slightly less 
guilty (M=1.9) than those who had no time to think (M=2.5), F(1,88)=3.20, p=.08. Females 
reported feeling more guilty (M=2.6) than males (M=1.8), F(1,88)=4.6, p=.04. No other effects 
reached significance. When controlling for behavior, the time effect was no longer reliable, 
F(1,87)=.72, p=.40. Predicting guilty feelings from behavior, sex, and the manipulations in 
separate models further supported the behavior and sex main effects previously reported. 
Additionally, a sex x behavior interaction emerged F(1,88)=3.8, p=.05, indicating that females 
who had acted unfairly had a tendency to feel more guilty (M=4.0) than males who had favored 
themselves (M=2.9), F (1, 22.6)=3.5, p=.07. Females who acted fairly did not differ from males 
who acted fairly (Ms=1.2 and 1.1, respectively), F(1,24.3)=.21 p=.70. 
Ashamed. With the exception of a marginal time x salience interaction F(1,88)=2.91 p=.09, 
there were no reliable predictors of feelings of shame. Decomposing the interaction revealed that 
those who had no time to think felt more ashamed (M=2.2) than those who did have time to think 
(M=1.5), but only when the standard was made salient (F(1,88)=3.8, p=.05). Controlling for 
behavior did not change these results. Again, including behavior in several different analyses 
supported the main effect of behavior across all analyses and, additionally, revealed a 3-way 
interaction of behavior, salience, and time, F(1, 88)=3.4, p=.07. Decomposing this interaction 
revealed that participants who acted immorally felt more ashamed when they had time to think 
(M=3.2) than when they did not have time to think (M=1.9), F(1,16.6)=3.97, p=.06, but only 
when the standard had not been made salient, F(1,22.2)=4.5, p=.05.  
Sorry. Before entering participants’ actual behavior, a marginal time effect emerged 
(F(1,88)=3.4, p=.07), suggesting that those who had no time to think felt more sorry (M=6.7) 
than those who did have time to think (M=6.0). Also, a salience x sex interaction emerged 
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(F(1,88)=4.5, p=.04), suggesting that females felt more sorry (M=2.7) when the standard was 
made salient than males (M=1.6), F(1,88)=5.5, p=.02. This gender difference did not emerge 
when the standard was not made salient, F(1,88)=.43, p=.51. When including behavior as a 
covariate in the model, the time effect was no longer significant, F(1,87)=1.13, p=.30. Predicting 
sorry from all possible 2- and 3-factor models that include behavior in addition to sex, time, and 
salience replicated the previously reported main effect of behavior (also see Table 8) and 
salience x sex interaction.  
Happy. Happiness was not predicted by sex, time, salience, or any of the interactions, 




Study 4 manipulated whether or not participants had time to think about their allocation 
before making the decision, either after a standard had been made salient to them or not. Once 
more, there was evidence that the participants perceived the $100 gift card as highly desirable. 
Although this effect was not reliable in the current sample, a trend emerged for those who had 
time to think to allocate fewer tickets to self than those who did not have time to think. For men, 
this was only true when the standard had also been made salient, possibly indicating that men 
were otherwise able to ignore the standard. However, a combination of a salient standard and 
time to reflect on the standard for men seems to have provided a condition of high self-awareness 
in which it was difficult to favor oneself without negative implications for the self. Only two 
men favored themselves and indicated feeling justified and happy, but not at all sorry, guilty, or 
ashamed about their behavior; six females favored themselves in the same condition, but clearly 
indicated feeling bad about their decision afterwards. Overall, moral behavior seems to have 
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been strengthened, rather than attenuated, by providing participants with time to think, which is 
inconsistent with the idea that participants generate self-exonerative arguments in anticipation of 
acting immorally.  
 
General discussion 
Recap of studies’ rationale and findings 
 
The goal of the present research was to provide a first test of the temporal aspect of moral 
disengagement theory. Though moral disengagement has enjoyed much popularity as a theory 
when explaining immoral behavior, many of its predictions have not actually been tested. Rather, 
moral disengagement appears to have become somewhat of an umbrella term for the justification 
of immoral behavior, particularly in the context of (intergroup) violence.  
Arguably the most crucial of the untested assumptions is that of temporal order. Is it that 
people restructure their behavior in anticipation of violating a standard (as the theory predicts), 
or are other processes equally, if not more, plausible? Captured by correlational research, other 
processes may resemble disengagement on the outside. One may recognize the various 
disengagement mechanisms in the justifications of immoral behavior (e.g., in scale items 
intended to measure moral disengagement), yet the processes underlying such justifications 
remain unclear. Are they post-hoc justifications by those who violated the standard (for whatever 
reason) and were then put on the spot, or are they deliberate attempts at disengaging a valued 
standard in the interest of circumventing self-sanctions?  
Using a new paradigm, the present research set out to address this problem and provide a first 
test of the theory as stated by Bandura (e.g., 1999). Specifically, the research sought to test the 
predictions that when a standard was endorsed in the abstract, but easily violated when personal 
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gains were expected, restructuring of the behavior as fair and justified, even moral, would 
precede violation of the standard. Further, there would be an absence of negative emotions in 
response to the behavior as a result of such disengagement. Adapted from a dictator game, a 
ticket allocation paradigm was used to show that the fairness standard was an easily activated 
and widely endorsed moral code (Study 1) and that a $100 gift card was desirable enough to 
provide a sufficient enticement to violate the fairness standard (Studies 2-4). Moreover, when 
participants were put in the position of the allocator (i.e., they could enter more tickets into the 
raffle in their own name, increasing their chances of a win), behavior was greatly at odds with 
the fairness standard that was easily endorsed in the abstract. Participants here on average 
allocated 1.5 tickets more to themselves than would be indicated by the fairness norm (Study 2). 
While self-favoring behavior and its post-decisional justification has been identified in the 
literature (e.g., Valdesolo & deSteno, 2008), it was unclear whether participants would adjust the 
fairness standard in anticipation of behaving immorally. For that reason, participants in Study 3 
were randomly assigned to make pre-behavioral fairness and morality judgments before or after 
learning of their personal roles. Though average ticket allocations to self did not differ by 
condition, 75% of those who favored themselves had indicated ahead of time that such behavior 
would be fair - if they made these judgments after learning of their role. Even though nobody 
justified self-favoring ahead of time in the role-unknown condition, participants favored 
themselves at a comparable rate. In other words, motivated by personal gain, participants in the 
role-known condition shifted the moral standard in their favor to enable behavior that maximized 
personal outcomes. However, among participants in the role-unknown condition, not shifting the 
standard in their favor ahead of time was no deterrent to violating the fairness norm. Moreover, 
regardless of pre-decisional judgments, participants who unfairly favored themselves recognized 
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their behavior was not fair and moral in the aftermath of their decision. Therefore, the moral 
“shifting” was not long-lasting, nor do these results seem to indicate post-behavioral adjustment 
of the standard as a way of justifying one’s previous behavior. In fact, those who favored 
themselves felt comparatively worse about having favored themselves, although overall the 
emotional reactions were rather mild. Lastly, providing participants with time to generate 
justifications in light of a salient standard and enticement for violating it (Study 4) provided 
another test of moral disengagement theory which suggests that disengagement is an effortful 
rather than an automatic process, requiring time and cognitive resources. Results indicated that 
participants had a tendency to allocate fewer tickets to themselves when they had time to think – 
another deviation from predictions. Having time to think seems, if anything, to have given 
students an opportunity to engage the standard. For men this was only true once the standard had 
been made salient, possibly because they were otherwise able to ignore the fairness standard. 
Furthermore, there was evidence that those who favored themselves knew their behavior was 
wrong and that they felt relatively more guilty, ashamed, and sorry than those who acted fairly or 
favored the other. 
In sum, there was little evidence of moral disengagement across the four studies. Although 
participants were prone to violating a standard that they had endorsed in the abstract when they 
could gain benefits from doing so, there was little evidence that it was pre-behavioral 
justification that enabled people to do so. Self-favoring occurred even in the face of clearly 
violating a previously endorsed norm. Providing participants with time to deliberate didn’t 
encourage the kind of self-exonerative reasoning suggested by moral disengagement either – in 
fact, people were less likely to violate the norm when they had time to think. Moreover, 
participants who did violate the fairness norm across the board indicated knowing that they had 
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done so and that they felt relatively worse about it than their fair counterparts (although not to a 
degree to which they seemed to suffer as a result of their action.)  
 
If not moral disengagement, then what? 
 
Among those who favored themselves, there was no evidence of moral disengagement in the 
studies presented here. In the context of this paradigm the failure to show disengagement of the 
moral standard begs the question of what, then, allowed people to violate the standard. Rather 
than disengaging the standard, it may have been that participants never engaged the standard.  
It is possible that participants avoided thought of the moral standard altogether – however, 
that seems unlikely given the frequent reminders of it in every study, either in the form of asking 
participants to indicate the standard, or by telling them the standard. Moreover, Studies and 1 and 
2 indicate that the fairness standard in the current situation is very salient and hence unlikely to 
be easily ignored. 
Perhaps, when asked, students identified knowledge of, rather than endorsement of the 
standard. It seems that participants did what they desired to do and took into account that they 
may feel guilty. Still, the feelings of guilt were mild and it is, of course, a possibility that 
participants reported feeling guilty because it seemed the appropriate (and learned) response to 
the situation. In the terms of Deci (1995), participants did not seem to have integrated the 
fairness standard to the point where they genuinely embraced and valued it for its own sake. If 
anything, they may have introjected it; they may have learned to adhere to it to avoid punishment 
from self and others. However, little speaks to the fact that participants tried to adhere to the 
standard in order to avoid self-punishment in the form of guilt (external punishment was 
explicitly removed as a possibility by telling participants that neither the experimenter nor the 
other participant would learn of their decision). Rather, it seems participants knew of the fairness 
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rule (they indicated so), but broke it anyway, and then, for good measure and because that’s what 
they have learned to do, they nodded to the standard but without conviction. Perhaps they have 
learned that the fairness standard is one that is broken frequently by themselves and others 
without many repercussions. In other words: they shrugged off their moral violation. Even if so, 
shrugging may be an after-effect. It is possible that participants, rather than avoiding thought of 
the moral standard, avoided thinking of their behavior before engaging in it. Study 4 in particular 
indicates that the time participants were provided was not so much a welcome opportunity for 
disengagement, but rather an unwelcome interruption to a more automatic desire to favor the self 
(or, as mentioned, an opportunity, if not an unintended but unmistakable hint, to them to engage 
the standard). Counter to moral disengagement, participants may not have wanted to think too 
much about their impending action and its implications. In light of the incentive of the gift card, 
they may have been driven by a desire to avoid engaging or disengaging the fairness norm 
altogether until they get to the desired behavior, at which point they would deal with the effects 
of their actions (however, some participants in Study 3 clearly engaged the fairness norm and 
still went on to break it, full-well knowing they did so). If anything, participants quickly altered 
the standard to serve their purposes, but soon thereafter admitted to having done wrong. Perhaps 
participants have learned that the rewards of acting against the “oughts” can exceed the 
punishments. And even if punishment is to come, it can often be reduced by appealing to 
ignorance, need, or other extenuating circumstances. This idea that participants may “act now, 
think later” is reminiscent of cognitive escape models that have been proposed in the context of 
coping, clinically relevant eating patterns, or risk-taking behaviors in health settings (e.g., 
unprotected sex among homosexual males; Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; Krohne, 1993; 
McKirnan, Ostrow, & Hope, 1996; Nemeroff, Hoyt, Huebner, & Proescholdbell, 2008). A 
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similar process has been suggested by Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman 
(1999) who found that participants ignored a clearly-labeled coin when flipping it assigned 
another participant (rather than themselves) to a positive task. The authors argue that participants 
avoided linking their own behavior to the very salient standard and show that making 
participants self-aware can eliminate this avoidance of one’s standard-behavior discrepancy.  
Lastly, it is possible that participants disengaged neither a standard nor thought, but affect. 
Perhaps thinking of one’s own (impending) behavior as immoral arouses anxiety but also 
anticipatory guilt and shame. What if it is those feelings that participants try to avoid; what if it is 
those feelings that they cannot escape from when they are made self-aware, as was the case in 
Batson et al.’s study? Indeed, altering or avoiding aversive experiences (rather than “just” 
thought) has been discussed as an important factor underlying many of the psychopathologies 
mentioned above (Chawla & Ostafin, 2007).  It seems plausible that feeling the negative 
consequences of one’s behavior (quite literally) is what encourages participants to behave 
morally. Perhaps it’s not thoughts that are punishing, but the accompanying feelings. Knowing 
that one is about to violate a standard without the pang of anticipatory guilt as a warning sign to 
oneself might not be a sufficient or effective means of discouraging immoral behavior.  
Two studies hint at the importance of affect in immoral behavior, and the possibility of 
affective disengagement: Dienstbier & Munter (1971) found that participants who had an 
opportunity to attribute negative arousal to a pill subsequently engaged in more cheating. 
“Knowing” the aversive affect they experienced resulted from something other than one’s 
intended behavior paved the way to that behavior. Similarly, Schachter & Latané (1964) found 
that participants were more likely to cheat when they had been given the tranquilizer 
chlorpromazine rather than a placebo. Anecdotal evidence, too, speaks to the possibility that 
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depressing arousal and numbing oneself enables people to commit even the worst of crime: 
police officers in Battalion 101 were charged with the task of exterminating the village of 
Józefów in Poland in July 1942. Among those who stayed to carry out the massacre, heavy 
alcohol consumption was reported, both during and after this unspeakable carnage (Browning, 
1992). 
In sum, further inquiry into cognitive and affective disengagement as ways in which people 
deal with the anticipation of immoral behavior seems warranted. 
 
Why no moral disengagement? Is moral disengagement dead? 
 
The fact that the present data are inconsistent with moral disengagement does not, of course, 
mean that it is time to lay the idea and study of moral disengagement to rest. If anything, it seems 
the story may be more complicated than thus far assumed, and it is quite possible that 
disengagement occurs in situations other than the one created in the present study. One may 
argue that allocating raffle tickets and giving oneself a ticket or two extra is hardly comparable to 
some other moral violations, examples of which were mentioned at the beginning of this paper. 
The present paradigm and paper are merely one way of addressing the question of how and when 
people justify immoral acts. Of course, it is possible that the prospect of other, more severe, 
violations is more threatening and harder to “shrug off”, more difficult to not think about, 
impossible to not feel. Bandura (1999) discusses several processes of moral disengagement in 
more serious circumstances, like the workings of corporations or moral disengagement in the 
context of war. It is possible that moral disengagement processes are activated in such contexts, 
in which repeated exposure to transgressions by others, acceptance of responsibility by authority 
figures, mention of the “other” as subhuman or deserving of harmful treatment, etc. provide the 
fiber out of which individuals may spin their immoral actions. Still, the reports of the Józefów 
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massacre and the high rates of PTSD among those who have killed in the context of war (and 
who have been exposed to ample rhetoric about the good purpose of the act and the bad character 
of the “enemy”) indicate that these justifications do not necessarily suffice to wipe out the 
embarrassment, the horror, the shame, and the guilt of one’s actions either (Maguen, Metzler, 
Litz, Seal, Knight, & Marmar, 2009; Maguen et al., 2010).  
Many immoral actions, no matter how desired, righteously perceived, and carefully 
calculated do seem to leave their mark not only the victim, but also on the perpetrator. Edgar 
Allen Poe’s character was not able to calmly tell his story, as promised, after all. His guilt so 
famously manifested itself in the reverberations of the victim’s still-beating heart from under the 
floorboards, making him increasingly fearful and ultimately leading himself to confess the crime. 
Do we shrug off the small transgressions, while the big(ger) ones eventually come back to 
haunt us - not just in form of the law, but also in our conscience, making justifications fleeting 
and fickle? Clearly, there remains a need and plenty of room for further research on how, when, 
and why people are enabled to behave immorally, and to what extent the various strategies are 
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Table 1 Correlations of allocations, ratings of morality and fairness, and emotions in Study 2 
(n=21) 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Number of 
tickets allocated to 
self 
1 -.61** -.79*** -.26 .39++ .41+ .13 .24 
2. Fair   1 .62** .40+ -.43* -.43* .04 -.25 
3. Moral    1 .44* -.61** -.49* .11 -.38+ 
4. Justified     1 -.52* -.57** .67*** -.39+ 
5. Ashamed      1 .84*** -.41+ .62** 
6. Guilty       1 -.36 .40+ 
7. Happy        1 -.08 
8. Sorry         1 




Table 2. Mean number of tickets allocated to self (standard deviations in parentheses) by 
condition (Study 3) 
 
 Women Men Total 
Role-unknown-condition (n=22) 5.9 (1.9) 5.5 (2.4) 5.7 (2.2) 





Table 3. Frequencies of favoring other, acting fairly, or favoring self in ticket allocations by 
gender, condition (Study 3) 
 
 Other-favoring allocation 
(more than 5 tickets to 
other) 
Fair allocation 
(5 tickets to self, 5 tickets 
to other) 
Selfish allocation 
(more than 5 tickets to 
self) 













Table 4. Correlations of allocations, ratings of morality and fairness pre and post, and emotions 
in Study 3 (n=42) 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
 Condition 1 (role-unknown, n=22) 
1. Number of 
tickets to self 
1 .10 .20 -.60** -.73*** -.62** .39+ .46* -.31 .54** 
2. Fair (pre)  1 .73*** -.27 -.12 -.26 .18 .21 -.16 .20 
3. Moral (pre)   1 -.27 -.01 -.39+ .06 .20 -.03 -.12 
4. Fair (post)    1 .71*** .65** -.18 -.32 .40+ -.40+ 
5. Moral (post)     1 .72*** -.31 -.43* .33 -.70*** 
6. Justified       1 -.26 -.45* .33 -.55** 
7. Ashamed       1 .82*** -.26 .60** 
8. Guilty        1 -.18 .57** 
9. Happy          1 -.51* 
10. Sorry           1 
 Condition 2 (role-known, n=20) 
1. Number of 
tickets to self 
1 .83*** .10 -.90*** -.66** -.56** .14 .61** .05 .37+ 
2. Fair (pre)  1 .09 -.75*** -.55** -.52* -.02 .34 .10 .27 
3. Moral (pre)   1 .01 .40+ .12 -.40+ -.10 -.04 -.50* 
4. Fair (post)    1 .83*** .65** -.30 -.80*** -.13 -.56* 
5. Moral (post)     1 .69*** -.67** -.76*** -.13 -.85*** 
6. Justified       1 -.50* -.66** .02 -.68*** 
7. Ashamed       1 .44* -.01 .85*** 
8. Guilty        1 .13 .60** 
9. Happy          1 .09 
10. Sorry           1 
Note. Fair and moral pre refer to the number of tickets participants indicated would be fair and 




Table 5. Correlations of number of tickets allocated to self, ratings of morality and fairness, and 
post-behavioral emotions for those who favored self by pre-behavioral justification (Study3) 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.# 10. 
 Adjusted fairness standard ahead of time (n=6) 
1. Number of 
tickets to self 
1 1*** -.08 -.30 .11 -.37 -.61 -.29 -.39 .17 
2. Fair (pre)  1 -.08 -.30 .11 -.37 -.61 -.29 -.39 .17 
3. Moral (pre)   1 .77+ .68 .11 .04 -.46 -.74+ -.59 
4. Fair (post)    1 .72+ .41 .00 -.30 -.55 -.91** 
5. Moral (post)     1 .30 -.62 -.62 -.92** -.83 
6. Justified       1 .00 -.62 .00 -.60 
7. Ashamed       1 .44 .63 .32 
8. Guilty        1 .61 .50 
9. Happy          1 .60 
10. Sorry           1 
 Did not adjust fairness standard ahead of time (n=10) 
1. Number of 
tickets to self 
1 .08 .17 -.64*** -.69*** -.56*** .36* .55*** -.21 .46** 
2. Fair (pre)  1 .63 -.16 -.05 -.21 .13 .14 -.15 .14 
3. Moral (pre)   1 -.18 .18 -.20 -.20 .15 -.01 -.30+ 
4. Fair (post)    1 .73*** .61*** -.26 -.48** .20 -.41* 
5. Moral (post)     1 .71*** -.50** -.54*** .18 -.75*** 
6. Justified       1 -.37* -.48** .24 -.58*** 
7. Ashamed       1 .73*** -.16 .73*** 
8. Guilty        1 -.07 .57*** 
9. Happy          1 -.29+ 
10. Sorry           1 
Note. Fair and moral pre refer to the number of tickets participants indicated would be fair and moral to 
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allocate to themselves; . + p<.10, *p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001, # 5 out of 6 participants rated their 




Table 6. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of post-behavioral ratings of fairness, 
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(1.0) 



























Table 7. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of post-behavioral ratings of morality, 
fairness, and emotions among those who favored self and either adjusted fairness standard 






Guilty Ashamed Sorry Happy Justified 
Adjusted fairness 
















Did not adjust fairness 
















Note. there were no mean differences for any of the outcome variables between those who 
adjusted the fairness standard ahead of time and those who did not 
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Table 8. Mean number of tickets allocated to self (standard deviations in parentheses) by 











(n= 12 per 
condition) 
Total 
Condition 1 (n=24) yes 6.8 (2.0) 4.8 (1.9) 5.8 (2.1) 
Condition 2 (n=24) 
Yes 
no 5.6 (1.6) 6.7 (2.2) 6.1 (2.0) 
Condition 3 (n=24) yes 6.6 (1.7) 6.9 (2.2) 6.8 (1.9) 
Condition 4 (n=24) 
No 































Table 9. Frequencies of favoring other, acting fairly, or favoring self in ticket allocations by 










than 5 tickets to 
other) 
Fair allocation 
(5 tickets to self, 5 
tickets to other) 
Selfish allocation 
(more than 5 
tickets to self) 































































Table 10. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of post-behavioral ratings of fairness, 














































Note. *** those who acted fairly differed from those who acted unfairly at p<.001 
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Table 11. Correlations of allocations, ratings of morality and fairness, and emotions in Study 4 
(n=96) 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
 Condition 1 (time and salience, n=24) 
1. Number of tickets 
allocated to self 
1 -.50* -.74*** .14 .50* .59** .24 .55** 
2. Fair   1 .73*** .10 -.38+ -.51* -.07 -.50** 
3. Moral    1 .10 -.45* -.66*** -.18 -.63** 
4. Justified     1 -.15 -.31 .42* -.27 
5. Ashamed     1 .80*** -.07 .77*** 
6. Guilty       1 -.18 .88*** 
7. Happy        1 -.21 
8. Sorry         1 
 Condition 2 (no time and salience, n=24) 
1. Number of tickets 
allocated to self 
1 -.90*** -.90*** -.60** .39+ .49* -.09 .35+ 
2. Fair   1 .97*** .70*** -.56** -.64*** .16 -.55** 
3. Moral    1 .74*** -.56** -.63** .14 -.52** 
4. Justified     1 -.51* -.53** .46* -.53** 
5. Ashamed     1 .87*** -.44* .90*** 
6. Guilty       1 -.33 .92*** 
7. Happy        1 -.49* 
8. Sorry         1 





Table 11 continued.  
 
 
  Note. + p<.10, *p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
 Condition 3 (time and no salience, n=24) 
1. Number of 
tickets allocated to 
self 
1 -.91*** -.80*** -.32 .77*** .69*** -.13 .54** 
2. Fair   1 .91*** .36+ -.79*** -.71*** .09 -.63** 
3. Moral    1 .48* -.85*** -.86*** .09 -.70*** 
4. Justified     1 -.48* -.51* .33 -.22 
5. Ashamed     1 .90*** -.21 .72*** 
6. Guilty       1 -.12 .73*** 
7. Happy        1 -.21 
8. Sorry         1 
 Condition 4 (no time and no salience, n=24) 
1. Number of 
tickets allocated to 
self 
1 -.73*** -.65*** -.62** .19 .64*** -.51* .58** 
2. Fair   1 .89*** .54** -.26 -.55** .36+ -.51* 
3. Moral    1 .61** -.27 -.43* .42* -.42* 
4. Justified     1 -.48* -.52** .66*** -.50* 
5. Ashamed     1 .67*** -.25 .81*** 
6. Guilty       1 -.33 .83*** 
7. Happy        1 -.33 
8. Sorry         1 
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(informed consent, lottery consent, and Introduction were identical for Studies 2 and 3) 
 
 
1. Informed Consent 
 
Informed Consent  
 
The following is a general description of the present study and a reminder of your rights as a 
potential participant.  It is important to keep in mind that this study is part of a research project.  As in any 
study, (a) participation is voluntary, (b) refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to 
which participants are otherwise entitled, and (c) participants can withdraw from the study at any time 
without penalty of loss of benefits to which they are otherwise entitled.  This study is being conducted in 
the Psychology Department. 
 
The present study was designed to assess psychological responses to decisions made in groups.  
You and another same-sex participant will be exposed to a decision that has consequences for you both. 
One of you will be randomly assigned to make the decision and both of you will be asked for your 
thoughts and feelings in several questionnaires. All tasks will be completed alone and there will be no 
interaction between the participants. All of your responses will be confidential and will be coded and 
securely stored.  There are no foreseen risks in participating.  The study will take approximately 60 
minutes to complete, and you will receive one hour of experimental credit for participating.  In addition, 
you will gain direct experience of psychological research.  Your participation will benefit us in furthering 
our understanding of how people respond to decisions in groups that have the potential to affect several 
members of the group. 
 
 We will try to answer any and all questions you may have about the research.  If your questions 
have not been adequately addressed, you can contact the principal investigators (Lydia E. Jackson at 
leckstei@utk.edu or her faculty advisors Dr. Dan Batson at dbatson@ku.edu or Dr. Lowell Gaertner at 
gaertner@utk.edu).  This research study has been reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review 
Board - Human Subjects in Research.  For research-related problems or questions regarding subjects’ 




I have read and understand the explanation provided to me.  I have had all my questions answered to my 





Printed Name  
 









Welcome and thank you for participating in our study! 
 
In this study, we are interested in how people think and feel about decisions made in groups. As 
you know, group members have to make many different decisions that may affect themselves 
and other members of the group. Some examples of such decisions may be assigning tasks and 
roles, responsibilities, or resources to group members.   How do people who make such a 
decision feel?  How do people who do not make the decision but are still affected by it feel?   
 
One of many open questions is how people feel about such decisions when they don’t know each 
other and don’t interact with each other. 
 
This research tries to address that question: 
 
You and the other same-sex participant in the study will be asked for your thoughts and feelings 
about a decision that has to be made. One of you will be randomly assigned to make that 
decision, but it will have consequences for each of you.   The two of you will not see each other 
or interact at all during this session, and you will be dismissed separately, so you will not even 
meet afterward. 
 
If you have no questions at this point and agree to participate, please carefully read, then date 
and sign the informed consent forms in front of you. When you are finished, please go ahead and 




3. Lottery consent form 
 
Lottery consent for tax-exempt organizations 
 
The University of Tennessee, being a public institution, is a tax-exempt non-profit organization. 
Such organizations can sponsor lotteries and raffles so long as (a) there is a winner, (b) 
participants have been informed that there will be a winner, and (c) winning participants are 
notified.  
 
I hereby consent to participate in the raffle for a $100 Target gift card, should my ID number be 
entered. I have been informed that there will be a winner who will be contacted in case of a win. 
 
 










MediaLab Screens Studies 2-4 
(each paragraph corresponds to a screen) 
 
Study 2  
 
Please carefully read the information on each of the next few screens. It is crucial that you only 
click "continue" once you have read and understood all the information on a screen.  When you 
are ready to begin, please click "continue". 
 
In this particular session, we are studying how two people think and feel about decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources. The two of you won't interact; only one of you will make 
the allocation decision.  
 
Specifically, the decision to be made in this session is this:  There are 10 tickets to be entered 
into a raffle for a $100 Target gift card. There will be several drawings throughout the semester 
and only participants of this study are eligible to enter, so the chances of winning a card are 
fairly high.  
 
In a few moments, the computer will randomly assign one of you to decide how to divide the 10 
tickets between the two of you. The other person (i.e., the one not making the decision) will be 
given a different task. 
 
At several points during the study you will both be asked to complete questionnaires concerning 
your thoughts and feelings.  In addition, we would like to talk with you about your reactions to 
the study.  To ensure anonymity and confidentiality of your responses, your identity cannot be 
linked to your ID number and you will never meet, or interact with, the other participant during 
or after the study (we ensure that you are dismissed separately). 
 
The computer will now assign each of you to tasks. Please allow a few seconds for this process. 
 
You have been chosen to be the DECIDER in this session, which means you will be the one who 
makes the decision of how the 10 raffle tickets are divided between the two of you.   For more 
detailed instructions, please click "continue" on the bottom right of the screen. 
 
As the decider, you can give yourself anywhere from 0 to 10 tickets; the other person gets any 
tickets you do not give to yourself. So, THE TICKETS ALLOCATED TO YOURSELF AND 
THE OTHER MUST ADD TO 10!  Remember that the tickets will enter an actual raffle for a 
$100 gift card, and a winner will be drawn several times during the semester. Of course, the 
more tickets a participant has, the better his or her chances of winning the raffle.  Thus, your 
allocation decision has a direct influence on the outcome for yourself and the other participant. 
 
Specifically, the more tickets you keep, the higher your chance of winning the gift card. The 
more tickets you give to the other participant, the higher the other participant's chance of 




Any tickets entered for "self" will automatically enter the raffle under your participant ID 
number, any tickets entered for "other" will automatically be entered into the raffle under the 
other participant's ID number.  To ensure that conditions match those of real-world big group 
settings, the other participant has been assigned a task that is unrelated to you and does not affect 
you. You will not meet or interact with the other participant at any point during the study and the 
exact nature of your decision will only be known to you. 
 
Your allocation will remain entirely anonymous and confidential. Your decision will only be 
known to you.  The other person only knows that there is a possibility his or her ID may be 
entered into a raffle for a $100 Target gift card.  Neither the other person nor the experimenter 
will know how many tickets you entered for yourself and the other person. The exact nature of 
your decision will therefore only be known to you! 
 
Before you make the decision, please answer a few questions about the task on the next few 
pages. When you're ready, please click "continue". 
 
Below, please enter your email address. Should your ID number be entered into the raffle and 
drawn as a winner, you will automatically be notified of your win by email. All information 
entered today is confidential and cannot be accessed by the research assistant running today's 
session (this is to ensure that he or she cannot learn of your decision). Should you be drawn as a 
winner, you will be sent an electronic receipt that you need to fill out and bring back to the 
department to claim your gift card. 
 
Please take a moment and imagine that you have won the $100 gift card to Target. Think about 
what you may buy with this card.  In the space below, please write down the things you would 
like to spend it on. 
 
How much would you like to win the gift card? 
 
How difficult do you consider the allocation decision to be? 
 
At this time, do you have any other thoughts about the allocation decision?  If not, please type 
"none". 
 
Ok, now you will make the allocation. Indicate below how many tickets you want to give to 
yourself and the other participant. Remember, you can give anywhere from 0-10 tickets to 
yourself - any tickets not allocated to yourself will go to the other person. 
 
Now, please answer a few questions about your experience as the decision maker. 
 
How fair was the way you divided the 10 raffle tickets between yourself and the other 
participant? 
 





How much did you like being the decider? 
 
The next few screens will list a number of adjectives that describe different feelings and 
emotions.  Indicate by clicking a number the degree to which you are feeling each of these 
emotional reactions RIGHT NOW, that is, AT THIS VERY MOMENT. 
 
Right now, I feel pleased 
 
Right now, I feel happy 
 
Right now, I feel justified 
 
Right now, I feel sad 
 
Right now, I feel surprised 
 
Right now, I feel upset 
 
Right now, I feel mistreated 
 
Right now, I feel guilty 
 
Right now, I feel satisfied 
 
Right now, I feel annoyed 
 
Right now, I feel irritated 
 
Right now, I feel disappointed 
 
Right now, I feel hurt 
 
Right now, I feel ashamed 
 
Right now, I feel lucky 
 
Right now, I feel proud 
 
Right now, I feel mad 
 
Right now, I feel sorry 
 
Right now, I feel offended 
 




In the space below, please tell us what thoughts went through you mind between (a) when you 
learned that you would allocate the tickets and (b) when you indicated your allocation decision 
on the computer.  Which of these thoughts affected your decision?  How? 
 
Finally, some questions about you... 
 
Are you ... 
 
How old are you? 
 
What is your current or intended major here at UT? 
 
Where on the following political spectrum do you place yourself? 
 
Have you ever participated in a study in these lab quarters (AP 405) before? 
 
Thank you! You have completed this portion of the study. Please slightly crack the door to give 
the experimenter a signal. 
 
 
Study 3  
 
Condition 1 (pre-behavioral judgment of behavior before role was known) 
 
Please carefully read the information on each of the next few screens. It is crucial that you only 
click "continue" once you have read and understood all the information on a screen.  When you 
are ready to begin, please click "continue". 
 
In this particular session, we are studying how two people think and feel about decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources. The two of you won't interact; only one of you will make 
the allocation decision.  
 
Specifically, the decision to be made in this session is this: There are 10 tickets to be entered into 
a raffle for a $100 Target gift card. There will be several drawings throughout the semester and 
only participants of this study are eligible to enter, so the chances of winning a card are fairly 
high.  
 
In a few moments, the computer will randomly assign one of you to decide how to divide the 10 
tickets between the two of you. The other person (i.e., the one not making the decision) will be 
given a different task. 
 
At several points during the study you will both be asked to complete questionnaires concerning 
your thoughts and feelings.  In addition, we would like to talk with you about your reactions to 
the study.  To ensure anonymity and confidentiality of your responses, your identity cannot be 
linked to your ID number and you will never meet, or interact with, the other participant during 




First, please answer a few questions about the task on the next few pages. When you're ready, 
please click "continue". 
 
Below, please enter your email address. Should your ID number be entered into the raffle and 
drawn as a winner, you will automatically be notified of your win by email. All information 
entered today is confidential and cannot be accessed by the research assistant running today's 
session (this is to ensure that he or she cannot learn of the decision maker's decision). Should you 
be drawn as a winner, you will be sent an electronic receipt that you need to fill out and bring 
back to the department to claim your gift card. 
 
Please take a moment and imagine that you have won the $100 gift card to Target. Think about 
what you may buy with this card.  In the space below, please write down the things you would 
like to spend it on. 
 
How much would you like to win the gift card? 
 
What, in your view, is the fair way to allocate the tickets? 
 
What, in your view, is the moral way to allocate the tickets? 
 
How difficult do you consider the allocation decision to be? 
 
At this time, do you have any other thoughts about the allocation decision?  If not, please type 
"none". 
 
The computer will now assign each of you to tasks. Please allow a few seconds for this process. 
 
You have been chosen to be the DECIDER in this session, which means you will be the one who 
makes the decision of how the 10 raffle tickets are divided between the two of you.  For more 
detailed instructions, please click "continue" on the bottom right of the screen. 
 
As the decider, you can give yourself anywhere from 0 to 10 tickets; the other person gets any 
tickets you do not give to yourself. So, THE TICKETS ALLOCATED TO YOURSELF AND 
THE OTHER MUST ADD TO 10!  Remember that the tickets will enter an actual raffle for a 
$100 gift card, and a winner will be drawn several times during the semester. Of course, the 
more tickets a participant has, the better his or her chances of winning the raffle.  Thus, your 
allocation decision has a direct influence on the outcome for yourself and the other participant. 
 
Specifically, the more tickets you keep, the higher your chance of winning the gift card. The 
more tickets you give to the other participant, the higher the other participant's chance of 
winning the gift card. 
 
Any tickets entered for "self" will automatically enter the raffle under your participant ID 
number, any tickets entered for "other" will automatically be entered into the raffle under the 
other participant's ID number.  To ensure that conditions match those of real-world big group 
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settings, the other participant has been assigned a task that is unrelated to you and does not affect 
you. You will not meet or interact with the other participant at any point during the study and the 
exact nature of your decision will only be known to you. 
 
Your allocation will remain entirely anonymous and confidential. Your decision will only be 
known to you.  The other person only knows that there is a possibility his or her ID may be 
entered into a raffle for a $100 Target gift card.  Neither the other person nor the experimenter 
will know how many tickets you entered for yourself and the other person. The exact nature of 
your decision will therefore only be known to you! 
 
Ok, now you will make the allocation. Indicate below how many tickets you want to give to 
yourself and the other participant. Remember, you can give anywhere from 0-10 tickets to 
yourself - any tickets not allocated to yourself will go to the other person. 
 
Post-behavioral questionnaire was identical to that in Study 2  
 
 
Condition 2 (pre-behavioral judgments were made after role was known) and Condition 3 
(identical to condition 2, but no pre-behavioral judgments) 
 
Please carefully read the information on each of the next few screens. It is crucial that you only 
click "continue" once you have read and understood all the information on a screen.  When you 
are ready to begin, please click "continue". 
 
In this particular session, we are studying how two people think and feel about decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources. The two of you won't interact; only one of you will make 
the allocation decision.  
 
Specifically, the decision to be made in this session is this:  There are 10 tickets to be entered 
into a raffle for a $100 Target gift card. There will be several drawings throughout the semester 
and only participants of this study are eligible to enter, so the chances of winning a card are 
fairly high.  
 
In a few moments, the computer will randomly assign one of you to decide how to divide the 10 
tickets between the two of you. The other person (i.e., the one not making the decision) will be 
given a different task. 
 
At several points during the study you will both be asked to complete questionnaires concerning 
your thoughts and feelings.  In addition, we would like to talk with you about your reactions to 
the study.  To ensure anonymity and confidentiality of your responses, your identity cannot be 
linked to your ID number and you will never meet, or interact with, the other participant during 
or after the study (we ensure that you are dismissed separately). 
 




You have been chosen to be the DECIDER in this session, which means you will be the one who 
makes the decision of how the 10 raffle tickets are divided between the two of you.   For more 
detailed instructions, please click "continue" on the bottom right of the screen. 
 
As the decider, you can give yourself anywhere from 0 to 10 tickets; the other person gets any 
tickets you do not give to yourself. So, THE TICKETS ALLOCATED TO YOURSELF AND 
THE OTHER MUST ADD TO 10!  Remember that the tickets will enter an actual raffle for a 
$100 gift card, and a winner will be drawn several times during the semester. Of course, the 
more tickets a participant has, the better his or her chances of winning the raffle.  Thus, your 
allocation decision has a direct influence on the outcome for yourself and the other participant. 
 
Specifically, the more tickets you keep, the higher your chance of winning the gift card. The 
more tickets you give to the other participant, the higher the other participant's chance of 
winning the gift card. 
 
Any tickets entered for "self" will automatically enter the raffle under your participant ID 
number, any tickets entered for "other" will automatically be entered into the raffle under the 
other participant's ID number.  To ensure that conditions match those of real-world big group 
settings, the other participant has been assigned a task that is unrelated to you and does not affect 
you. You will not meet or interact with the other participant at any point during the study and the 
exact nature of your decision will only be known to you. 
 
Your allocation will remain entirely anonymous and confidential. Your decision will only be 
known to you.  The other person only knows that there is a possibility his or her ID may be 
entered into a raffle for a $100 Target gift card.  Neither the other person nor the experimenter 
will know how many tickets you entered for yourself and the other person. The exact nature of 
your decision will therefore only be known to you! 
 
Before you make the decision, please answer a few questions about the task on the next few 
pages. When you're ready, please click "continue". 
 
Below, please enter your email address. Should your ID number be entered into the raffle and 
drawn as a winner, you will automatically be notified of your win by email. All information 
entered today is confidential and cannot be accessed by the research assistant running today's 
session (this is to ensure that he or she cannot learn of your decision). Should you be drawn as a 
winner, you will be sent an electronic receipt that you need to fill out and bring back to the 
department to claim your gift card. 
 
Please take a moment and imagine that you have won the $100 gift card to Target. Think about 
what you may buy with this card.  In the space below, please write down the things you would 
like to spend it on. 
 
How much would you like to win the gift card? 
 




What, in your view, is the moral way to allocate the tickets?  
 
How difficult do you consider the allocation decision to be? 
 
At this time, do you have any other thoughts about the allocation decision?  If not, please type 
"none". 
 
Ok, now you will make the allocation. Indicate below how many tickets you want to give to 
yourself and the other participant. Remember, you can give anywhere from 0-10 tickets to 
yourself - any tickets not allocated to yourself will go to the other person. 
 
The post-allocation questionnaire was identical to that administered in Study 2. 
 
 
Study 4, conditions 1-4 (time and salience manipulations are highlighted in bold) 
 
Please carefully read the information on each of the next few screens. It is crucial that you only 
click "continue" once you have read and understood all the information on a screen. 
 
 In this particular session, we are studying how two people think and feel about decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources. The two of you won't interact; only one of you will make 
the allocation decision.  
 
Specifically, the decision to be made in this session is this:  
There are 10 tickets to be entered into a raffle for a $100 Target gift card. There will be several 
drawings throughout the semester and only participants of this study are eligible to enter, so the 
chances of winning a card are fairly high.  
 
 Below, please enter your email address. Should your ID number be entered into the raffle and 
drawn as a winner, you will automatically be notified of your win by email. All information 
entered today is confidential and cannot be accessed by the research assistant running today's 
session. Should you be drawn as a winner, you will be sent an electronic receipt that you need to 
fill out and bring back to the department to claim your gift card. 
 
 Please take a moment and imagine that you have won the $100 gift card to Target. Think about 
what you may buy with this card. (participant writes what he/she would like to purchase) 
 
 How much would you like to win the gift card? (1=not at all; 7=extremely) 
 
 In a few moments, the computer will randomly assign one of you to decide how to divide the 10 
tickets between the two of you. The other person (i.e., the one not making the decision) will be 
given a different task. 
 
 At several points during the study you will both be asked to complete questionnaires concerning 




The computer will now assign each of you to tasks. Please allow a few seconds for this process. 
(computer takes a few seconds to "work" on random assignment) 
 
 You have been chosen to be the DECIDER in this session, which means you will be the one 
who makes the decision of how the 10 raffle tickets are divided between the two of you.  
 
 As the decider, you can give yourself anywhere from 0 to 10 tickets; the other person gets any 
tickets you do not give to yourself. So, THE TICKETS ALLOCATED TO YOURSELF AND 
THE OTHER MUST ADD TO 10! 
 
 Specifically, the more tickets you keep, the higher your chance of winning the gift card. The 
more tickets you give to the other participant, the higher the other participant's chance of 
winning the gift card. 
 
 Any tickets entered for "self" will automatically enter the raffle under your participant ID 
number, any tickets entered for "other" will automatically be entered into the raffle under the 
other participant's ID number. 
 
 Your allocation will remain entirely anonymous and confidential. Your decision will only be 
known to you.  
 
[salience manipulation]  
Most people think the fairest way to divide the tickets is evenly, giving 5 tickets to oneself 
and 5 to the other person, but how you choose to divide them is entirely up to you. 
 
The other person only knows that there is a possibility his or her ID may be entered into a raffle 
for a $100 Target gift card, but they will not know whether it actually is entered or with how 
many chances.  
 
Neither the other person nor the experimenter will know how many tickets you allocated to 
yourself and how many to the other person. How you allocate the tickets will be known only to 
you. 
 
[time manipulation]  
Some of our participants have found it helpful to be given some time to think about their 
decision. You may take the next few moments to do so. The screen will automatically 
prompt you to make your allocation in a few minutes. However, after you see the prompt, 
you may take as much time as you need before entering your allocation.  
 
So, take a few moments to think about how you want to divide the tickets, then, after you see the 
prompt and are ready, enter your allocation. (participant is given 2 minutes time, then the screen 
changes to ...) 
 
 Ok, now you will make the allocation. Indicate below how many tickets you want to give to 
yourself and the other participant. Remember, you can give anywhere from 0-10 tickets to 









How fair was the way you divided the 10 raffle tickets between yourself and the other 
participant? 
 
 How moral was the way you divided the 10 raffle tickets between yourself and the other 
participant? 
 
 The next few screens will ist a number of adjectives that describe different feelings and 
emotions.  Indicate by clicking a number the degree to which you are feeling each of these 




How difficult do you consider the allocation decision to be? 
 
 In the space below, please tell us what thoughts went through you mind between (a) when you 
learned that you would allocate the tickets and (b) when you indicated your allocation decision 
on the computer.  Which of these thoughts affected your decision?  How? 
 
 At this time, do you have any other thoughts about the allocation decision?  If not, please type 
"none". 
 
 Finally, some questions about you... 
 
 What is your current or intended major here at UT? 
 
 How old are you? 
 
 Are you ...(male or female) 
 
 Where on the following political spectrum do you place yourself? 
 
Have you ever participated in a study in these lab quarters (AP 405) before? 
  
Thank you! You have completed this portion of the study. Plesae slightly crack the door to give 
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